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Towards Enriching Understandings and Assessments of Freedom of 
Religion or Belief: Politics, Debates, Methodologies, and Practices 
Katherine Marshall  
 
Summary 
Promoting the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) is a foreign policy priority for 
several countries, their concerns accentuated by considerable evidence of rising levels of 
violations of this right worldwide. This puts a premium on solid evidence and on clear 
assessment criteria to serve as objective guides for policy. This paper reviews the 
complex landscape of approaches to assessing and measuring both the status of FoRB 
and the degree to which this human right is being violated or protected. It introduces and 
describes various transnational methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, which 
focus, in differing ways, on violations. Several are widely cited and have express policy 
applications, while others have more indirect application to FoRB. The analysis highlights 
the diversity of approaches, which both reflect and contribute to a tendency to politicise 
FoRB issues. Challenges include differing understandings of the nature and relative 
significance of violations and their comparability. Country analysis is crucial because the 
specific context has vital importance for a granular appreciation for causes and impact of 
FoRB violations. This granularity, however, is poorly reflected in broader quantitative 
transnational and time series indices that highlight trends and comparative impact. The 
review highlights the limited degree to which FoRB issues, specifically violations and 
religiously related discrimination, are integrated in the policies and practice of 
development approaches (including social change and progress towards wellbeing) 
internationally and nationally. Effective approaches to addressing violations are few and 
far between, especially at the international level. The review notes strengths and 
weaknesses of specific approaches to assessment and reflects on possible 
improvements focused on development challenges and better integration among 
aspects of human rights.  
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Introduction: why the review?  
 
The human right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) is an integral part of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948), as well as the legally binding International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and several other human rights 
conventions. Many national constitutions guarantee – to varying degrees – the freedom 
to believe and to worship, and to live free of discrimination (including on the grounds of 
religion or belief). FoRB as a distinct right has something of a life of its own, and some 
significant controversies are associated with it.1 While there is little contestation as to the 
validity and importance of the right itself, there is less consensus about what it implies, as 
well as when and how it is or is not respected, and thus how to judge and measure its 
application in practice. Areas of dispute include classification of violations: number and 
severity, their causes, and appropriate policy responses. Further complicating the picture 
are increasingly political overtones of approaches to the topic. Distinctive concerns of 
advocates for FoRB, differing perspectives, and limited attention to FoRB concerns per se 
among broader human rights communities have contributed to a regrettable separation 
in tactics and alliances. Given evidence of negative trends in respect of FoRB, and a will to 
address violations amid tensions among human rights communities over definitions and 
methods, there is a premium on solid evidence as well as on clear criteria for assessment 
to serve as objective guides for policy related to international affairs, including 
international development. 
 
FoRB features increasingly prominently among foreign policy priorities of various country 
governments as well as in non-governmental organisation (NGO) advocacy and 
programming. Promoting religious freedom has been an explicit aim of US foreign policy 
since 1998, and FoRB has a large focus in the UK’s foreign policy as well. Several other 
governments focus explicitly on FoRB. Various networks support the sharing of 
information and cooperation explicitly on FoRB.2 This focus generally applies broadly to 
all religious and belief communities and relationships among different communities as 
well as with the state, but sometimes at a practical level it centres on concerns for 
 
1  ‘Religious freedom’ is the term used most widely in the US; ‘FoRB’ is the term used in international legal settings and 
in many countries. The terms tend to be used interchangeably, though there are distinctions, notably where ‘or 
belief’ is emphasised. For background on FoRB and debates and tensions around it, see Petersen and Marshall 
(2019).  
2  The International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief was established by Canada in 2015 and includes 
nearly 30 countries and international organisations committed to protecting and promoting FoRB. Primary 
participants are capitals-based representatives from foreign ministries or other ministries with responsibility for 
FoRB. The International Religious Freedom Alliance was formally established in February 2020, promoted by the US 





specific minority religious groups. Common themes and shared objectives among foreign 
policy professionals have been to assure professional and objective standards for 
engagement with religious communities and to address areas of tension and 
disagreement within a broad framework of human rights. Correcting blind spots and 
tempering biases that result from preconceptions, specific interests, as well as imperfect 
sources of information are further objectives. Interreligious tensions, fragility, and conflict, 
including violence linked to extremism that carries religious overtones, has been a sharp 
focus in some settings. Religious engagement broadly and a striving to improve religious 
literacy among officials have been entry points for some, though by no means all, actors. 
Most international development and humanitarian organisations have rarely addressed 
the topic directly and explicitly, though many (multilateral, bilateral, and private) have 
increasingly recognised a need to be informed and sensitive about religious topics 
(Tadros and Sabates-Wheeler 2020; Marshall 2015a).  
 
Sound policy approaches, for both diplomacy and development, require analysis that is 
well grounded in evidence and that is seen to be as objective as possible. Policy analysts 
are also keenly interested in early warning systems, risk assessments, and indicators that 
highlight identifiable patterns. The primary objective and policy thrust of such analysis 
needs to be grounded in human rights and justice as well as concerns for peace and 
wellbeing. FoRB analysis ideally will highlight contextual situations, provide a sound basis 
for comparison, and assess trends within and across time, contexts, and groups where 
relevant and possible. Intrareligious, interreligious, and state/religious relations affect 
peace and social cohesion (within and among nations) and thus conflict analysis and 
peacebuilding strategies as well as the quality and sustainability of development. The 
roles of religious actors and institutions broadly, and minority communities more 
specifically, in conflict situations, mediation, and reconciliation are therefore an 
increasing focus of attention.3 Examples here include the Central African Republic, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Myanmar, and Afghanistan.4  
 
 
3  The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has pursued analysis of religious peacebuilding, generally and in guides 
(see, for example, Religious Peacebuilding Action Guides). Among scholars who have explored both individual 
traditions for peacebuilding and interreligious approaches are Mohammed Abu-Nimer (2013 and Abu-Nimer and 
Garred 2018); S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (2015), and Craig Zelizer (2013). Susan Hayward and Katherine Marshall 
(2015) explore religious peacebuilding traditions of different faiths and specifically issues around the common 
exclusion of women from visible and formal processes whether led by religious or non-religious actors. 
4  The US Institute of Peace (USIP), Institute for Global Engagement (IGE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Search for 
Common Ground (SFCG), and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers have focused on religious 





Since the 1990s, reporting on FoRB by governments, NGOs, think tanks, academic 
analysts, and diverse religious groups has expanded significantly.5 The reporting varies 
considerably in scale, methodology, emphasis, audience, and quality. Much reporting can 
be characterised as qualitative, taking narrative forms, with descriptions and varying 
levels of analyses focused often on specific FoRB cases and conditions. However, 
quantitative measures and aggregations of data that document levels and trends of 
violations are sought after within policy circles, as a basis for sound and objective 
assessments across countries and regions. Several quantitative measures are available, 
with others under development, offering possibilities for cross country and regional 
comparisons, and assessments over longer periods of time.  
 
A backdrop for this review is concern that violations of the right to FoRB are widespread 
and are growing worse.6 It is grounded in the CREID programme’s focus on inequalities 
among and within religious communities, where inequalities are most pronounced. Both 
FoRB violations and inequalities matter because of their human cost and, more broadly, 
implications for peace, stability, and plural, inclusive societies. In contemporary societies, 
where pluralism is the de facto norm in most countries, intergroup tensions that often fall 
along religious lines are a concern for security and social cohesion. Religious tensions, 
conflicts, and violations of FoRB, and notably their neglect in both diplomacy and 
international development thinking, detract from progress on many fronts, including 
many of the individual Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Where religious 
discrimination is a factor in the fundamental dynamics of societies, it can be a driver of 
poverty overall and harm many who fall among the groups that are most marginalised 
and left furthest behind. Discrimination against specific religious communities affects that 
group and, often, the community at large, heightening risks of violence and conflict and 
undermining or distorting social cohesion and equitable governance. FoRB violations are 
important not only in themselves; they affect the full gamut of development objectives.7 
These considerations put a premium on careful and objective measurement, especially 
approaches amenable to broad assessments of the situation and trends. 
 
This paper thus reviews the landscape of assessment and measurement, exploring 
different methodologies that are available to assess the status of FoRB. The paper’s 
 
5  Abrams (2018) provides a stocktaking of two decades; it is US focused but articulates the common foundation for 
the focus on religious freedom. See also Marshall (2007) for a broad background, and Petersen and Marshall (2019) 
and Bettiza (2019). 
6  See, notably, Pew Research Center (2019). 
7  See, for example, analysis in two Berkley Center/World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) country reviews on 






discussion is guided by underlying operational questions that relate to international 
development thinking and policymaking: To what extent are development approaches – 
national and international (social change, progress towards wellbeing) in their frames of 
reference, policy, and practice – aware of and alert to issues facing religious communities 
overall, and to challenges facing specific religious communities? How far, and in what 
ways, do methodologies that focus on assessing FoRB and related topics offer insights of 
which institutions are unaware or treat it with low priority? Are there major gaps in 
information or analysis that might enrich understanding and programmes? Might some 
aspects of FoRB violations potentially inject or maintain or even deepen biases? How are 
the roles of religious minorities understood and addressed? What are responses to cases 
where rights are violated? The underlying objective is to highlight ways to assure more 
equitable treatment and to address violations. This in turn highlights questions around 
information sources and bases for assessment. 
 
Many operational assessments used by development institutions that address FoRB in 
explicit ways are country focused and rely heavily on qualitative assessments. Some tend 
to link various identity markers, including ethnicity and social class alongside religious 
affiliation. The paper explores, briefly, the ways in which religious inequality dimensions 
are and are not reflected in broader indices that are widely used in international 
development and humanitarian assessments, which include the Human Development 
Index (HDI), Social Progress Imperative (SPI), Transparency International indexes, 
Freedom House, the Mo Ibrahim Index, and World Economic Forum indices.  
 
Part I of the paper provides background about the methodologies that assess FoRB 
violations and debates around them. These include the history of different approaches as 
part of the international human rights systems, the nature of violations (including debates 
about their nature and relative severity), how the topic relates to international 
development, how methodologies are used, and why the topic and associated 
methodologies can become politicised. It thus describes the overall landscape of different 
assessment approaches. The final section of Part I presents reflections drawing on the 
analysis. In Part II, different methodologies are examined in greater depth, especially 
those that are most widely cited in assessing FoRB violations. The review is not 
comprehensive; some approaches are treated in considerable detail, based on 
interviews, while others draw primarily on published information. Some groups are 
introduced as illustrative of different approaches, including some whose focus on FoRB or 
religion broadly is fairly marginal. The review does not purport to assess the 






Part I: Assessing FoRB and Violations 
1.1. Challenges: rights, pluralism, development, and politics 
 
1.1.1 Human rights and FoRB 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which highlights and specifies that 
freedom of religion or belief (FoRB ) is a central human right, is a foundational document 
for global governance and it aims to set out universal aspirations.8 FoRB is thus presented 
as a ‘universally’ shared objective, with more specific and binding provisions echoed, 
elaborated, or qualified in various conventions,9 and – to varying degrees – in the 
constitutions and laws of many if not most countries.10 Countries nonetheless approach 
the role of religion as a facet of national identity, and relationships among different 
religious communities, and particularly relationships between religious institutions and 
the state, vary widely. They range from deliberately secular states to various secular/state 
religion hybrids, to countries with a religious foundation for national identity and law 
(Saudi Arabia is an example). In this setting, approaches to pluralism, including religious 
pluralism, vary widely and can be sharply contested. An example is Myanmar where the 
role of the Buddhist identity is significant and extends (albeit in complex ways) to 
questions of citizenship rights. The meaning of secularism is seen very differently in, for 
example, India, France, and the US.  
 
In a recent report, the UN Special Rapporteur on FoRB highlights different state–religion 
models and their implications for FoRB (Shaheed 2020). Highlighting three types of 
relationships – (a) states with official or favoured religions; (b) states with no identification 
towards a religion; and (c) states that pursue policies to heavily restrict the role of religion 
– the Special Rapporteur warns against the use of the notion of ‘state religion’ to 
discriminate against any individual or group but also against ‘doctrinal secularism’, which 
can reduce the space for religious or belief pluralism in practice. States must, he argues, 
 
8  When the UDHR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 (when there were 58 
member countries of the UN), a handful of countries, including Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and former Soviet Bloc 
countries, abstained. Saudi Arabia’s stated reservations to the UDHR were that its call for freedom of religion 
violated the precepts of Islam, and that the human rights guaranteed by the Islamic-based law of Saudi Arabia 
surpassed those secured by the UDHR. As the UDHR is a non-binding declaration, there is no mechanism whereby 
countries that joined the UN after 1948 could sign or adhere to it. 
9  Notably the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted in December 1966, 
entered into force January 1976, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in 
December 1966, and entered into force in March 1976. 
10  See International Standards on Freedom of Religion or Belief for a useful summary of different elements and 





satisfy obligations including measures that guarantee structural equality and fully realise 
FoRB. The concept of ‘respectful distancing’ – i.e. political and legal, but not social, 
disentanglement from religion – is recommended, with states acting as an impartial 
guarantor of FoRB to all regardless of the relationships between state and religion or 
belief. 
 
From a human rights perspective, the freedom to practise one’s belief or religion is not 
unlimited. Governments are entitled to impose restrictions in order to ‘protect public 
safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’, as noted 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Limitations based on 
public health concerns have been highlighted during the Covid-19 emergency, which has 
illustrated and, in some instances, tested the extent and limits of ‘legitimate’ restrictions. 
Security threats and realities of terrorist movements and groups with religious ties or 
ideologies expressed in religious terms are the primary, nominal justification used for 
restrictions imposed on various religious groups and forms of practice. In many instances, 
however, restrictions are clearly discriminatory and disproportionate, and as such 
illegitimate from a human rights perspective.  
 
Three other large questions come into play, important because they shape approaches 
that underlie assessments of FoRB and links to both international relations and 
development programmes. First, how is the right to FoRB related to other rights - for 
example, to freedom of speech and equality before the law? Second, what are the 
responsibilities of governments and, still more complex, of other country governments 
and citizens, to address religiously-related discrimination, ranging from annoying 
behaviours to violence and, most extreme, genocide. The transnational nature of (some) 
religious communities makes these questions especially significant and complex. A third 
set of questions arise from debated understandings of collective cultural rights and 
identities (bordering on or coinciding with religious identities) against individual freedoms. 
These often involve debates within religious communities as well as among them and 
they affect international development and humanitarian work in different ways. 
Arguments made in different countries, explicitly or less so, challenge what is an explicit 
part of FoRB, which guarantees free expression of one’s beliefs and individual rights to 
choose and change one’s religion, on the grounds that such activities can be disruptive to 
social cohesion and to aspects of national identity.11 Some religious norms and practices 
regarding relations between men and women clash with understandings of gender 
 





equality as a fundamental human right. The right to proselytise and seek to convert is also 
contested.12  
 
An additional complicating factor is treatment of religious groups that are considered 
extremist and thus the large body of analysis, policy measures, and programmes that fall 
under the heading of ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) or ‘preventing violent 
extremism’ (PVE). Methodologies and approaches that track, measure, understand, and 
predict forms of extremist behaviours that resort to violence do have a relationship to 
issues of both government restrictions on religion and social hostilities, notwithstanding 
questions about how far religious beliefs and ties are directly involved. Government 
restrictions on particular religious groups and practices are often justified in terms of 
security, linked to the looming threat of violence (witness Myanmar, China, Russia, 
France, and numerous other cases). These rationales are used to justify restrictions that 
apply, notably, to the right to assemble and demonstrate, and to journalism. More 
broadly, social hostilities against particular religious groups or individuals are in some 
situations linked to fear of violence. Attitudes and restrictions directed to specific religious 
communities may be shaped by violent incidents linked to religious groups in the society 
or even internationally, even if the specific group has no history of or propensity to violent 
speech or action. Poor knowledge or fear of the unknown or of difference can also 
contribute. These questions and complications have relevance for policymakers as they 
set debates and actions affecting FoRB within the broad context of diplomacy and 
development strategies that address security and social cohesion, and thus look to 
objective measures of trends and indications of violations.  
 
1.2 Political dimensions and issues 
 
Political dimensions turning on broad foreign policy approaches to FoRB issues (alluded 
to above)13 spill over into debates about various measurement approaches and indices. 
The debates arise from and are linked to differing basic narratives about, for example, 
which communities suffer most acutely and why. Several organisations put forward data 
and narratives arguing that Christians are the world’s most persecuted religious 
communities. They cite the large numbers of Christian victims and martyrs as a reason for 
concern and concerted action. Alternative narratives focus on persecution of Muslims. 
Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are central to some narratives, as are the plight of other 
specific groups like Yazidis and Baha’is. The backdrop of the Holocaust, the genocide of 
 
12  This topic is explored in depth in Petersen (2020). 
 
13  Marie Juul Petersen and Katherine Marshall (2019) present a broad review of FoRB, including history and 





Jews, colours many approaches to the topic and justifies a sharp focus on patterns of 
escalating discrimination and violence. Colonialism is also cited, with prominence given 
to the impact (especially negative) of Christian missionaries associated with European 
colonisation (the interlinked impact of merchants, missionaries, and the military – the ‘3 
Ms’ – is a continuing theme). The rise in religious nationalism – there are Christian, Islamic, 
Hindu, Jewish, and Buddhist examples today – also colours discussions of how 
approaches to FoRB analysis and advocacy are framed.  
 
The central purpose of most methodologies is to assess the nature of harm and suffering, 
linked both to government restrictions and maltreatment and to societal actions, and 
thus point to underlying causes, and options available to address them. Assessing relative 
levels of suffering is rarely their focus; neither are positive models of success (though this 
absence has been critiqued, generating some response). Special interest and bias, real or 
perceived, can contribute to or accentuate politicisation of the topic, and are not 
conducive to thoughtful analysis and action. 
 
1.3 FoRB and development 
 
Explicit consideration of how FoRB, FoRB violations, and thus methodologies that aim to 
assess their impact, are related to development is relatively new terrain. The questions 
are, however, closely tied to the broad concerns outlined above, notably the links to social 
cohesion and to obstacles to inclusive policies and programme design. The paper by 
Mariz Tadros and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler (2020) on inclusive development outlines the 
halting, mixed, but expanding agenda of ‘religion and development’, discussing different 
approaches to religious engagement and pointing to the general lack of attention to 
FoRB and religious minority issues.14 In the author’s long experience with strategic 
discussions in an international development organisation, the topics of FoRB and religious 
discrimination never arose as such. What has been far more prominent is the role of 
ethnicity (take Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, and Guatemala as examples). There has been 
considerable pertinent research and associated policy reflection on issues related to 
ethnic diversity, intergroup tensions, and ethnic discrimination. Tensions have been linked 
to the geographic focus of development programmes, which in turn may tie to the 
concentration of different ethnic communities, as in some instances they overlap with 
religious minorities. Thus, indirectly attention has focused on inequities that in turn may 
accentuate religious inequalities, though this has rarely been treated as such. The political 
 
14  One of several reviews of scholarship on the evolving field of religion and development is Swart and Nell (2016). 
There is a growing literature on links between religious engagement, development, and peacebuilding; important 





roles of minorities that hold significant if informal power (the central argument in scholar 
Amy Chua’s World on Fire) have figured in analyses of governance and accountability, 
and sometimes specific religious identities have been involved, with violent incidents one 
outcome (Chua 2004; Marshall 2016); Indonesia and Malaysia are examples. Scholar 
James Scott (2010) highlights this argument in Asia, pointing to compromises that 
specific minority groups have made with both governments and majority communities to 
secure a basis to operate, with significant implications for development strategies. 
Overall, the longstanding and persisting difficulty in finding operational ways to reflect the 
obvious need to ‘take culture into account’ contributes to the patchy record in thorough 
and well-grounded analysis of the impact of relationships among religious communities 
and with the state.15  
 
An exception to the overall picture of lack of attention to religious inequalities in 
development settings was an explicit discussion in the World Bank during its 2016 review 
of ‘safeguard policies’. These policies have historically focused on environmental 
protection and cultural heritage, but during this broad review, the possible expansion of 
the policies to include religious discrimination was discussed. The context was to explore 
whether it was feasible or desirable to take into account ‘all relevant environmental and 
social risks and impacts of the project, including - (ii) risks that project impacts fall 
disproportionately on individuals and groups who, because of their particular 
circumstances, may be disadvantaged or vulnerable’. Disadvantaged or vulnerable is 
defined (in a footnote) as ‘those who, by virtue of, for example, their age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, physical, mental or other disability, social, civic or health status, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, economic disadvantages or indigenous status, and/or 
dependence on unique natural resources may be more likely to be adversely affected by 
the project impacts and/or more limited than others in their ability to take advantage of a 
project’s benefits’. Following a meeting in March 2016, the difficulty in defining practical 
ways to bring these issues into a common and workable operational framework resulted 
in a decision that the topic of religious discrimination would not be included explicitly in 
the new policy (World Bank 2017).16 This specific case highlights some of the obstacles in 
the way of defining, in what is inevitably a politicised environment, appropriate 
approaches that focus on religious inequalities in relation to their impact on development 




15  On this topic, see Robert Klitgaard (2021).  





Several analysts, with data sets and analysis, have endeavoured to link religious freedom, 
human development, and economic development. A notable (and quite controversial) 
example is ‘Is Religious Freedom Good for Business? A Conceptual and Empirical 
Analysis’ by Brian J. Grim, Greg Clark and Robert Edward Snyder (2014). The argument 
advanced is that ‘religious freedom may be an unrecognised asset to economic recovery 
and growth’. The study examines and presents the argument for a positive relationship 
between religious freedom and ten of the 12 pillars of global competitiveness, as 
measured by the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. It 
 argues that religious hostilities and restrictions create climates that can drive away local 
and foreign investment, undermine sustainable development, and disrupt huge sectors of 
economies. Religious freedom, when respected within a company, for example, can 
directly benefit the bottom line.  
 
Debates about this approach focus primarily on questions about causality, as well as the 
difficulties inherent in defining the rigorous quantitative comparators that would be 
needed to establish which aspects of either respect for FoRB or its violation would link to 
different aspects of development performance. None of these questions call into question 
the benefits and validity of religious freedom as a fundamental part of human rights; at 
issue is whether available data and qualitative information is sufficient to build a robust 
case for causal links. 
 
1.4 Violations of FoRB: definitions and debates  
 
International human rights standards define FoRB violations as involving situations where 
a person or community is prevented from having, adopting, changing, or leaving their 
religion or belief, is coerced to act in a manner contrary to their religion or belief, is 
prevented from practising or manifesting this religion or belief, is discriminated against on 
the basis of their religion or belief, or is prevented from bringing up their children in 
accordance with their beliefs and in a manner that respects the child’s evolving capacity 
to make independent decisions (Annexe 1 lists different types of violations). Some 
elements of FoRB are absolute rights that cannot legitimately be restricted (the right to 
have, adopt, or change a belief or religion, and the right to be free from coercion), but 
others, related to the right to manifest or practise one’s belief or religion, can be restricted 
under certain circumstances.17 FoRB violations thus refer both to restrictions specifically 
 
17  The ICCPR, with further explanation set out in the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 22, defines 
acceptable limitations subject to the following restrictions: they must be proscribed by law; necessary in order to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or to protect the basic human rights and freedoms of others; and 





on having and practising a religion or belief, and to broader violations in which a person’s 
religion or belief (or lack thereof) is a component. Examples are exclusion from job 
markets, discrimination in the health-care system, or persecution on grounds of religious 
or belief identity. A complexity is that discrimination or persecution against people with a 
particular religious identity is not necessarily religiously motivated and hostility that 
seems to have a clear religious motivation is rarely motivated solely on religious grounds. 
The role of religion in discrimination and persecution can thus be overestimated or 
underestimated.  
 
1.5 Challenges in definitions, assessment, and measurement  
 
Definitions and sources of data both present important challenges, as different 
disciplines, different traditions, and different organisations may take quite different 
approaches. A specific question arising is the definition of ‘authentic’ religion versus, 
notably, extremist forms and ‘cults’, as they are termed in some settings. Other key 
questions concern distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate restrictions, and 
criteria as to the groups to which restrictions can legitimately be applied. Differences by 
language also enter the picture as to what a ‘religion’ is called and where perceived limits 
apply. Questions arise in relation to various forms of religious practice where the 
boundaries between culture and religion are contested or blurred (circumcision and dress 
are notable examples). Annexe 2 describes as an example evolving debates in France, 
where the government has listed and regulated certain groups on various grounds, 
including their potential for undue influence (brainwashing). Most significant are different 
approaches to understandings of violations and the underlying factors that contribute to 
them. There is considerable historical evidence that supports the hypothesis that even 
minor instances of discrimination and bullying (person to person or by community, 
including through social media) can escalate, sometimes rapidly, suggesting that any 
evidence of specific groups warrants serious attention. 
 
Data on religious adherence, which is notoriously difficult to measure, can affect broad 
understandings of FoRB and thus violations. Judd Birdsall and Lori Beaman (2020) 
highlight the widespread use of the Pew Research Center’s (2012) figure that 84 per cent 
of the world’s population has a religious affiliation. The number itself, as Pew clearly 
indicates, is indicative and surrounded by numerous questions. However, essentially it 
highlights that religious beliefs and communities are important for a significant majority 
of the world’s population. But the questions that arise point both to definitional questions 
– what does adherence mean? (attendance at ceremonies? identification by community? 
overlap with ethnicity?) – and to the depth and significance of that adherence. Invariably, 





they are perceived. Shortcomings in demographic data on religious adherence are, to say 
the least, significant among countries and the data are often highly contested. Some 
countries forbid collection of data on religious adherence, for example, or exclude either 
the general question or some groups from census data. These basic questions around 
defining and counting apply especially to many religious minority communities whose 
status may well be contested or deliberately downplayed or inflated.  
 
A final and obviously critical set of ‘basic’ questions relate to how to define and assess 
performance on assuring the right to FoRB. International human rights law is clear and 
broadly accepted as to FoRB. However, scholar Jonathan Fox (2020a) argues that there 
is, in reality, no clearly accepted definition and, more significant, operational 
understanding of religious freedom, and that many accepted definitions include 
contradictory elements. This is reflected both in the lack of consensus in national 
legislation and in fundamental inconsistencies among different facets commonly used to 
measure FoRB that Fox points to. His analysis further suggests that few countries can 
claim real freedom of religion by frequently used definitions, including several democratic 
nations that pride themselves on religious freedom. While surveys indicate that, in 
practice, many citizens respond positively that their freedom of belief and worship is 
respected (e.g. Banerjee 2008), Fox’s argument highlights the many areas where different 
priorities and understandings of elements of FoRB are pertinent both for the analysis of 
methodologies and for policy response to inequities and violations.18  
 
1.6 Defining and rating violations 
 
Questions about how to identify violations (whether by states or taking the form of social 
hostilities) and to assess and compare them are central to this review of different 
methodologies.19 They involve the types of data that are included and how and by whom 
they are collected and analysed, types of violations that are the focus, responsibility for 
violations and for addressing them, and rating and ranking of pervasiveness, severity, and 
significance. 
 
The data that go into different reports and rankings come from diverse sources, collected 
in different ways. These include analysis by observers and experts, fact-finding missions, 
field visits, interviews, surveys, newspaper monitoring, social media mining, and citizen 
reporting. Reports drawing on this data also take quite different forms: annual or periodic 
reports, thematic analyses, or global rankings. Some cover all groups and individuals 
 
18  Useful reference documents include Ackerman and Finlay (n.d.); Bielefeldt (2018); Bielefeldt, Ghanea and Wiener 
(2016); Evans (2006); Fox (2019a, 2019b); Hertzke (2012); Marshall (2013). 





while others look more narrowly at FoRB violations for a particular community. Some 
reports involve overviews and rankings based mainly on secondary sources (annual 
reports of the European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and 
Religious Tolerance and the Pew Research Center’s annual reports on restrictions on 
religion are examples). Various quantitative data sets include basic information on the 
status of FoRB in different countries (Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project, the 
Association of Religion Data Archives’ Religion and State Dataset, and Boston University’s 
World Religion Database). In Table 1, a rough typology of different kinds of violations is 
presented that sets out some specific examples that mark situations of severe 
persecution, discrimination, and what might be termed intolerance or exclusion, by the 
state or non-state actors.20  
 
Table 1: Typology of pervasiveness of violations21 
State Non-state 
Severe violations (persecution) 
The state commits to, sponsors, or 
tolerates religion-related acts of violence, 
or fails on several occasions to prevent or 
respond appropriately to such acts. 
The state punishes the adoption of, 
changing of, or abandoning a religion or 
belief, blasphemy, religious insult and 
criticism, with death, forced labour, or long 
imprisonment. 
The state systematically applies 
restrictions on individuals’ or groups’ 
freedom to manifest or practise their 
religion or belief. 
The state engages in or tolerates 
systematic discrimination based on 
religion or belief against one or more 
groups or their individual members. There 
is, in practice, total or almost total 
Non-state actors systematically attack 
individuals or groups for adoption, 
changing, or abandoning a religion or 
belief, blasphemy, religious insult and 
criticism. 
Non-state actors systematically 
interfere with individuals’ or groups’ 
freedom to manifest or practise their 
religion or belief. 
Non-state actors engage in systematic 
discrimination based on religion or 
belief against one or more groups or 
their individual members. 
 
20  This draws on the analysis in Petersen and Marshall (2009) and earlier analysis by Gatti et al. (2019). 
21  Petersen and Marshall (2019). This typology builds on the methodology developed by Gatti et al. (2019) for the 





impunity for those who engage in 
systematic discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief. 
Discrimination 
The state fails to prevent or respond to 
occasional religion-related acts of 
violence by non-state actors. 
The state punishes the adoption, 
changing, or abandoning of a religion or 
belief.  
The state punishes blasphemy, religious 
insult, and criticism with shorter 
imprisonment or the payment of fines. 
The state applies restrictions in specific 
contexts,22 without generally preventing 
individuals and groups from practising 
their religion or belief. 
The state engages in occasional 
discrimination based on religion or belief 
against one or more groups or their 
individual members. Laws are in place to 
deter and punish discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, but coverage 
is not total and/or they are not well 
implemented.  
Non-state actors occasionally attack 
individuals or groups for adoption, 
changing, or abandoning a religion or 
belief, blasphemy, religious insult, and 
criticism. 
Non-state actors occasionally or in 
specific contexts interfere with 
individuals’ or groups’ freedom to 
manifest religion or belief. 
Non-state actors engage in frequent, 
but not systematic, discrimination 
based on religion or belief against one 
or more groups or their individual 
members. 
Intolerance and exclusion 
The state responds to acts of occasional 
religion-related acts of violence by non-
state actors, but with delays or 
inefficiency. 
The adoption, changing, or abandoning of 
a religion or belief, blasphemy, religious 
insult, and criticism are not legally 
prohibited or punished, but are 
administratively difficult. 
Non-state actors engage in sporadic 
religion-related acts of violence. 
The adoption, changing, or abandoning 
a religion or belief, blasphemy, religious 
insult, and criticism are met with 
widespread criticism and social control. 
Non-state actors engage in the 
intolerant and discriminatory practices 
against individuals or groups because 
 





There are no legal restrictions on 
individuals’ or groups’ freedom to manifest 
religion or belief, but occasional 
administrative obstacles. 
The state does not engage in 
discrimination based on religion or belief, 
but does not actively respond to societal 
discrimination and intolerance, more often 
than not, but does not have in place the 
measures needed to effectively deter and 
punish discrimination fully. 
of their religious or belief identity and 
practices. 
Non-state actors engage in intolerant 
and discriminatory practices from time 
to time against individuals or groups 
because of their religious or belief 
identity and practices, but know that 
they may face sanctions. 
 
Several of the methodologies aim to assess the pervasiveness or intensity of violations of 
FoRB. This can be a complex exercise, with some topics of focus included in the UDHR, 
Article 2, while others relate to rights to manifest or practise one’s belief or religion, which 
can be restricted under certain circumstances. Explicit or implicit judgements are 
involved, but the central issue is whether the right to live free of discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief and the right to be free from coercion is guaranteed and 
respected. Common questions in various methodologies include the following: Is there 
violence linked to religious adherence? Is the right to have, adopt, change or leave religion 
and to be free from coercion restricted? Are instances of violence, restrictions, and 
discrimination systematic or occasional? Are they widespread or sporadic? Are violations 
justified by national law or is there resort to law? Are individuals arrested or detained, 
charged or sentenced in relation to these violations? Where violations that are illegal 
occur, is access to justice available in practice and is it effective?  
 
Direct or indirect discrimination that is linked to an individual’s or a community’s religion 
or belief is contrary to international human rights law. From the perspective of the 
individual or community involved, understanding the ultimate motivation of the 
discriminating party may, however, seem irrelevant. A further complication is that in 
some situations, adherence to a religious community is imputed to individuals who do not 
actually hold that religion; for example, when religious adherence is associated with an 
ethnicity.  
 
Genocide is the ultimate expression of persecution and its definition and understanding 
its causes and responses are intensively examined.23 The definition focuses on 
circumstances where the state commits, sponsors, or tolerates acts with intent to destroy 
 





a group, in whole or in part, or when non-state actors commit acts with intent to destroy a 
group, in whole or in part.24 This can include killing members of the group; causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group. Under the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states are obligated to act.  
 
The Responsibility to Protect,25 spurred or inspired by genocidal horrors in Rwanda, 
Burundi, Cambodia, and Kosovo, among others, was approved, unanimously, at the 2005 
high-level UN World Summit meeting. It represents a framework for international 
obligations in relation to prevention of and response to the most serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. It does not specifically address FoRB or 
its violation, but they are linked by history and by circumstance to understandings of R2P. 
 
In rating pervasiveness, severity, and impact, the responsibilities of states and social 
actors, including non-state actors, such as terrorist and vigilante groups, political parties, 
media, businesses, religious leaders, and other organisations may be involved. 
Indifference and tacit support by civil society groups can also be a factor.  
 
A scale of violations and interlinkages is explicit or implicit in some of the methodologies. 
Linkages to broad social goals may be at issue, including the effectiveness of conflict 
prevention and resolution. Counts or estimates of the numbers of individuals involved in 
pertinent religions may be deliberately downplayed or inflated by different actors. An 
important issue that is often ignored is the link between aspects of FoRB and gender 
equality. The roles of gender equity in relation to FoRB deserves particular attention, yet it 
is rare that they are a primary focus (see Petersen 2020 and Tadros 2020). Another topic 
that merits additional attention is the types of role played by intrareligious and 
interreligious bodies in highlighting violations or mitigating them and assessments of their 
effectiveness. 
 
1.7 Different measures, qualitative and quantitative, public and private  
The discussion below describes briefly various approaches and methodologies that focus 
on FoRB, with additional detail in Part II. The methodologies outlined include 
measurement efforts and reports initiated and supported by public authorities 
 
24  Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  





(transnational, national, and more local), and a variety of non-state methodologies. Some 
rely heavily on qualitative reporting, while others aim to establish and evaluate 
quantitative assessments. The review is not comprehensive, but it includes widely cited 
methodologies and a sample of different kinds of resources, focusing on their stated aims 
and areas of focus as well as the methods they employ to collect, analyse, and present 
findings. Table 2 summarises different categories and approaches. 
 
Table 2: Broad categories of measures and assessments 
 
Category of approach Public/government linked Non-public 
Broad-based 
methodologies drawing on 
secondary sources; 
quantitative and 
comparative focus.  
 • Pew Research 
Center: GRI Index 
(government 
restrictions, policies, 
laws) and Social 
Hostilities Index 
(SHI) (religious 
hostility by private 
individuals) 






Methodologies that rely on 
the review of primary and 
secondary qualitative data, 
examining a range of 
sources to provide a 
contextual analysis.  
• UN Special 
Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion 
or Belief 
• US Department of 
State, Office of 
Religious Freedom  





• Organization for 
Security and Co-
• Open Doors 















Human Rights, Hate 
Crime Reporting  
• European 
Parliament 
intergroup on FoRB 
and Religious 
Tolerance (RT) 
Observatories of religious 
violence/pluralism that 
monitor incidents as they 
happen, involving the 
continuous monitoring of 
online media.  
 
 






• Observatory on 
Intolerance and 
Discrimination 
Against Christians in 
Europe 





• The Observatory on 
Radicalisation 
• Hate and Violence 
Speech Observatory 
Syria 
• Observatory of 
Religious Freedom 
in Latin America 
(OLIRE) 
• eMore Europe 
• Centre for the 
Analysis of Social 








monitoring of social 
media) 
• The Community 
Security Trust (CST) 
Long-term reflections on 
trends including genocide 
prevention. 









 • The International 
Civil Society Centre  
• World Movement 
for Democracy  
• CIVICUS  




• Muslim Council of 
Britain 




religious freedoms and 
religious inequalities 








Country or community 
specific reporting  
Wide range of government 
reports 
• Tolerance and 
Diversity Institute 
(TDI) (Georgia) 







• Iraqi Ceasefire 
Centre for Civilian 
Rights (use of social 
media data mining)  







in India  
• Burma Human 
Rights Network 
(periodic reports on 




and Christians in 
Myanmar)  
• Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee’s 
Freedom of Belief 
Initiative (İnanç 
Özgürlüğü Girisimi) 
in Turkey (periodic 
information on the 
FoRB situation in 
Turkey)  
• National Christian 
Evangelical Alliance 










Widely used measures and 
rankings on development 
• UNDP Human 
Development Index 
• World Bank CPIA 
• Human Rights 
Watch 
• International Crisis 
Group 
• Freedom House 




• World Economic 
Forum 




1.8 Towards analysis and conclusions 
 
The reports, data sets, maps, and qualitative stories provide a rich set of information and 
thus a strong foundation for analysis and action. To this more formal set of materials 
should be added a wide range of more personal witnessing, in the form of films, videos, 
other forms of art, and interviews, for example. Methodologies span a wide gamut, from 
quantitative and global, to qualitative and more focused on regions, countries, and 
communities. Approaches differ also in looking to trends over time.  
 
A striking finding of the review is the diversity of efforts to measure and report on topics 
related to FoRB, and particularly violations. With increasing availability of different types 
of data (linked inter alia to new technologies) and rising interest in and advocacy for 
FoRB, the number of efforts has multiplied in recent years. The different approaches 
provide important evidence and insights into situations where rights of people and 
communities are abused and people suffer. The review nonetheless highlights significant 
concerns. These arise in large part from different understandings of priorities in promoting 
FoRB and responding to violations; these do not together indicate a clear narrative of the 
overall situation. Mechanisms to address persecution begin with its definition and 
understandings of early warning signs, as well as positive appreciations of effective 
responses. In all three instances there are significant weaknesses. Also of concern is the 
polarisation among communities on the nature and priority of different forms of 
discrimination, persecution, abuse, and other FoRB violations. The complex picture that 
emerges from the review of the different methodologies and some of the quantitative as 
well as qualitative findings, leaves fundamental questions as to why worsening trends are 





also arise as to links among different indicators of respect for or violation of FoRB, and 
between FoRB and other human rights and development indicators. 
 
The use of indicators of religious freedom and violations in most international 
development and humanitarian institutions at present is quite limited. Integrating ways in 
which religious indicators, including of FoRB, treatment and welfare of religious 
minorities, and FoRB and other human rights violations into the many measures of 
development progress and challenges is a topic that deserves reflection and priority 
action. This applies especially for governance and fragile state situations but has 
implications for human development and humanitarian work in all its many dimensions. 
 
Another priority need is to look more to positive measures and examples that explore 
especially proactive measures to reinforce religious pluralism and tolerance. There is also 
a need for expanded efforts to deepen understandings of the causes for abuse and other 
violations of freedoms. As issues of discrimination and stigma translate into both hate 
speech and violence, looking to approaches in education systems is an example of where 
links could be strengthened. 
 
The Covid-19 emergency highlights areas of debate around state–religion relationships 
and appropriate and lawful restrictions as well as essential freedoms, and thus offers 
excellent opportunities for dialogue among the different actors involved (Weiner and 
Lavery 2020). Engaging two particular communities, human rights advocates and 
international development institutions, in an effort to address these issues might offer a 
path forward. 
 
The following paragraphs highlight more detailed comments arising from the review and 
pending questions. 
 
Context needs to be considered as a priority. Respect for and violation of religious 
freedom and FoRB depend in great measure on the specific context of the country or 
society. This is of paramount importance for diplomatic or development response and 
action. No widely accepted methodology for country analysis on FoRB per se exists. 
Country-specific thematic analysis is exemplified in the extensive and sui generis US 
Department of State reports. These draw on quite wide sets of information and build year 
to year, but they offer little framework for comparison among countries, often focus on a 
quite narrow range of issues, and eschew judgements either on the overall situation or on 
trends. Robust case studies and country overviews are needed to gain a granular 
understanding of the particular conditions that account for the trends seen in data and 





Religious measures are strikingly missing in methodologies and indices that assess 
human development progress. The most widely used approaches to assess and compare 
development and humanitarian programmes and performance rarely devote more than 
marginal attention to religious dimensions, including FoRB. This includes the indicators for 
the 17 SDGs and 167 targets and human rights reviews. Reasons include habits and 
conventions, poor data, and lack of consensus on what to measure. The pertinent 
question is whether and how including FoRB and religious inequality measures might 
offer new insights. How might rankings and ratings change? 
 
Data verification is especially challenging for FoRB. This perennial and persistent 
challenge is accentuated by particular sensitivities around assessing violations and thus 
necessary secrecy or discretion in many local contexts. The wide diversity of situations, 
including in the nature and severity of violations, is another important factor. The Pew 
methodology which is so widely used relies entirely on secondary sources. The Pew 
ratings process uses data-verification checks reflecting best practices, such as double-
blind coding (coders do not see each other’s ratings), inter-rater reliability assessments 
(checking for consistency among coders), and carefully monitored protocols to reconcile 
discrepancies among coders. Cross-verification between sources is used. By relying on 
multiple sources, Pew works to integrate available facts from disparate sources and 
resolve ambiguities or gaps in data. However, the odd comparisons that emerge highlight 
the data challenges involved at a fundamental level. 
 
Data limitations are an important challenge. Countries may limit, censor, or manipulate 
records, media, or other publicly available information. There may be over-reporting in 
freer-access countries, leading to saturation, while under-reporting in countries with more 
repressive governments may lead to major information gaps and distorted data. Self-
reported data or data obtained through interviews may be limited by distrust or 
confidentiality concerns. Headline-capturing news may reflect poorly significant or even 
under-reported but important happenings in a region (dogs that do not bark). Divisive, 
controversial, or politically charged events may dominate media and research attention 
and distort their relative scale. 
 
Rankings or ratings can be helpful for broad brush appreciations but are fraught with 
some significant pitfalls. Minority Rights, Early Warning Project, Open Doors, CIVICUS, 
Transparency International, and various other international and national reports and 
online platforms use country rankings or ratings to analyse and present their data. These 
can be compelling and help in conveying the kind of broad picture and comparisons that 
policymakers and analysts (as well as the media) find useful. However, with respect to 





These differences cannot readily be standardised, given the vital importance of context in 
assessing how FoRB is understood and applied. Even when two countries have the same 
score or rating, this may well not reflect similar conditions (witness the thoughtful 
observations of Birdsall and Beaman on the Pew Research Center religious freedom 
ratings).26 Quantitative analysis resulting in ratings and rankings may blur or miss differing 
magnitudes and frequency of persecutions or oversimplify situations. Underlying causes 
and mechanisms of persecution are not reflected. Some assessments rely on surveys of 
perceptions, posing similar questions to those often raised for the widely used 
Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index. 
 
Methodologies focusing on issues for specific traditions such as Christians, Jews, and 
Muslims can be important and useful in mobilising concern and directing attention to 
critical issues but can distort overall approaches to advancing FoRB. Indigenous religious 
communities merit far sharper attention in FoRB discussions and action. Tradition-
focused assessments are helpful in bringing greater levels of detail and context to the 
situations, including transnational trends and comparisons among situations. They tend, 
however, to beg questions of comparison and context which loom large in policy 
discussions. An example is the ways in which the indicators treat, respectively, concerns 
about anti-Semitism, persecution of Christians, and Islamophobia as focal issues, often 
without probing analysis of how they are linked to each other and to the broader policy 
and social context. A focus on smaller but at times highly marginalised religious minorities 
has been achieved (e.g. Bah’ais, Ismailis, and, more recently, Yazidis), but these and other 
similar groups remain under-resourced in terms of both information gathering and 
resources to disseminate information gathered. There is a continued need to ensure that 
the ‘World Religions’ do not overshadow very serious impacts on the smaller 
communities, such as the Kaka’i community in Iraq. Of particular concern currently is the 
vulnerability and invisibility of indigenous belief systems and religions that are being 
decimated by the loss of territories and land with either natural features or ancestral 
burial sites that are critical to their world view and spiritual systems and beliefs. It is tragic 
and wrong that indigenous peoples feature so little in debates at this time about FoRB. 
 
How religion is defined presents specific and significant issues. Such disagreements and 
ambiguities lie behind some tensions and restrictions, including in roles that women play, 
new religious movements, and intrareligious tensions. Also important is the fact that the 
vulnerability of religious communities is often linked to non-religious as well as more 
strictly religious motives, with behavioural, practise aspects of religious communities 
playing roles. Social tensions are often linked to emerging or contested religious 
traditions. In the Covid-19 emergency, different burial traditions assume particular 
 





importance and give rise to often serious tensions. With complex religious identities, 
especially where lived religion is concerned, the issues involved in discrimination, hate 
speech, stigma, and violence can have twisted and complex roots. Especially important 
are the host of issues around gender relations and family practices. Different approaches 
to sexuality, age of marriage, women’s right to work, roles within the family, divorce, and 
attitudes towards ‘honour’, pride, and ‘dignity’ can play roles in violations of basic 
freedoms and contribute to inter-group tensions.  
 
The element of judgement in methodologies focused on FoRB should be better 
appreciated and acknowledged in policy discussions, and some underlying issues 
involved around power and politics should be taken into account. Much reporting aims to 
support judgements about overall trends and causes of problems as well as risk 
assessments. Such comparisons are difficult, and subjectivity is hard to avoid, especially 
among those in humanitarian communities where respect for neutrality is an important 
mantra. The data involved come from multiple sources and are most often partial and 
unreliable. This poses significant challenges for policymakers who are often required to 
speak to judgements. The designation by the US president (via the Secretary of State) of 
Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs), with tangible consequences for people of the 
country concerned, is an example. The Pew Research Center’s analysis and rankings, 
including the distinction between the Government Restrictions Index (GRI) and the Social 
Hostilities Index (SHI), have particular importance because they respond to the need and 
desire for respected sources of evidence. They are broadly seen as objective, allowing 
reasonable comparison over time. The measures are based on a scale of points given for 
violations, as indicated by a series of specific questions, with data-verification through 
double-blind coding, inter-rater reliability assessments, and carefully monitored 
protocols. The RAS database is also respected and used by multiple sources. 
Nonetheless, both are inseparable from the primary sources that go into the analysis, all 
of which are subject to at least some element of selectivity and judgement. The issue of 
neutrality can also, however, reflect or contribute to avoidance of measuring or 
interacting with religious or ethnic factors. Acknowledging religion as a factor means 
acknowledging existing power structures and that adding resources into a context where 
different actors have different power, social status, social and political capital, etc. is far 
from neutral, risking, for example, maintaining or deepening inequalities. 
 
There are complex practical and ethical questions around incident reports and ways to 
link them to policy instruments. This applies to urgent action as well as to the need for 
deeper understanding of causes both of government restrictions and social hostilities. An 
example of a vital and urgent topic is hate speech and violent incidents, given the need to 





considering the sources of primary data used in several if not most methodologies. The 
position and identity of the data gatherer and data-gathering processes vary and present 
practical and ethical dilemmas. Issues of trust and trustworthiness are involved. This 
poses significant ethical questions about treatment of data but also more practical 
questions about how far the data can be generalised and accepted as representative 
and trustworthy. But the voices that courageously report, despite risks, need and deserve 
to be heard. 
 
More recognition of wide gaps between law and policy and what happens in practice is 
needed, including in dialogue with the governments concerned. Laws or legal protection 
may not be indicative of an authentic, practical guarantee of rights. They may, however, 
figure in reporting that draws on official narratives. This speaks to the need to focus on 
implementation, with solid grounding in what are likely to be complex local realities. 
Focusing on laws and regulations is a central issue but this is often only part of the story. 
 
The data used in virtually all the methodologies and reports are imperfect and efforts to 
address flawed data bring some specific risks and potential distortions. Data are always 
incomplete, with flaws and important gaps. For the topics at hand, many gaps matter in 
important ways. Analyses may simplify complex realities because they rely on limited as 
well as uncertain variables. Complex interactions among social, political, and cultural 
factors that so often contribute to the vulnerability of specific religious communities or 
individuals are difficult to discern. There is a contrast between measurement approaches 
that adopt something of a ‘laundry list’ approach with numerous variables, which run the 
risk of being so specific or narrow that they are insufficiently comprehensive, or so 
comprehensive that they have ‘extensive lists of factors contributing to religious violence 
and revolution’27 that offer little basis for action. The longer lists complicate the task of 
data collection and, though they help to identify pieces of the puzzle, may well provide 
little real help in putting it together.28 Focusing on a small number of variables to describe 
religious freedom runs the risk of overlooking the specific and often complex human 
security threats to which religious minorities are vulnerable.  
 
Cross-national comparisons tend to centre on the nation-state, with macro-level 
indicators and high levels of generality across what may be very different regions and 
communities. Nuance and specificity are, however, vital to understanding the issues 
involved and, still more, acting on them. Measuring and assessing civil society and social 
attitudes more broadly is critical, but especially difficult. That includes groups far beyond 
 
27  Petri (2020). 





religious institutions, such as organised crime and indigenous authorities. A human rights 
perspective tends to consider the state as the primary actor with responsibility for human 
rights violations. During the Cold War, many communist regimes played outsize roles with 
the actions of governments restricting religions. Several methodologies in effect 
responded to these concerns in their origins. States are still responsible for many FoRB 
restrictions, but the social dynamics related to religious conflict have become increasingly 
complex and need an equal focus. 
 
In sum, a range of cross-country assessment tools and reports on FoRB have emerged in 
recent years. They present different results, depending on the methodology and specific 
observations as well as the position of the evaluators. Positively, the efforts overall help to 
document, quantify, and compare the situation of freedom of religion across world 
regions and countries. However, significant areas call for discerning attention in how they 
are used. The underlying bases for analysis and the data used are patchy, they often 
neglect or oversimplify local realities, they tend to focus primarily on government roles, 
and they may reflect quite restrictive understandings of both religion and secularisms.29 
Important groups may be excluded. In contrast, the daily life of large groups of citizens on 
which pluralism must be grounded may vanish from sight in a focus on a small set of 
incidents and individuals.  
 
The goal of both FoRB advocacy and of specific methodologies is to enhance authentic 
commitment to this human right. To achieve this goal in practice, assessments and 
interventions need to focus sharply on specific situations and problems, both to identify 
areas for action and to enhance understanding of underlying trends. Future challenges 
include how to adjust for differences between countries (demographically, politically, etc.) 
when standardising methodologies for data collection and analysis. Including 
country/regionally specific qualitative analysis and thematic overviews may help address 
the shortcomings of a ranking or scoring system and highlight key issues and specific 
challenges/developments/observations. Factors such as intrareligious harassment 
(including gender) need to receive sharper focus. In short, there is no simple narrative for 
either respect for or violations of FoRB. While the differing methodologies illuminate some 









PART II: Methodologies Focused on FoRB 
 
2.1 Official reports and underlying methodologies 
 
2.1.1 UN Special Rapporteur  
 
Within the United Nations system, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief has a specific responsibility to follow and report on the status of FoRB. The office 
(one of some 32 special rapporteurs30) was established in 1986 when the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights appointed a ‘Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance’ 
(Resolution 1986/20); the title was changed in 2000 to ‘Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Religion or Belief’.31 The present Special Rapporteur, Ahmed Shaheed, is the fifth to 
hold the position.32 The Rapporteur’s mandate is significantly broader than reporting on 
FoRB violations and the work is especially pertinent because over the years, the 
Rapporteur has grappled with many of the most contentious issues involved in relation to 
human rights and international law – for example, rights to conversion and proselytising – 
and thus areas of tension that are linked to violations. A March 2019 report focused on 
FoRB and freedom of expression as two closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing 
rights (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 2019). A February 2020 
report highlights the links between FoRB and the right to gender equality, and the October 
2020 report focuses on racism.33  
 
The Rapporteur’s official mandate involves promotion of measures at the national, 
regional, and international levels ‘to ensure the promotion and protection of the right to 
FoRB’; identifying existing and emerging obstacles to the enjoyment of FoRB and 
presenting recommendations on ways and means to overcome such obstacles; making 
continued efforts to examine incidents and governmental actions that are incompatible 
with the provisions of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and to recommend remedial measures as 
appropriate; and applying a gender perspective, among other things, through the 
identification of gender-specific abuses, in the reporting process, including in information 
collection and in recommendations. 
 
30  As of October 2020, the Human Rights Council oversees 44 thematic mandates and 11 country-specific mandates. 
31  See Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the mandate.  
32  See an interview with UN Special Rapporteur Ahmed Shaheed.  






The Rapporteur works by (a) transmitting urgent appeals and letters of allegation to UN 
Member States on cases that represent infringements of or impediments to the exercise 
of the right to FoRB; (b) undertaking fact-finding country visits; and (c) submitting annual 
reports to the Human Rights Council, and the UN General Assembly, on activities, trends, 
and methods of work (United Nations 2011: 2).34 The Rapporteur draws on a combination 
of complaints received and information gathered during country visits. Reports thus rely 
on the analysis of trends and priorities by the Rapporteur and his/her office (though, it 
should be noted, the capacity of office is limited by resource constraints). The Rapporteur 
has not articulated a specific methodology to guide the selection of priorities. Thus, the 
office works by examining and articulating underlying conceptions of FoRB that provides 
a framing for what is being monitored and assessed and the types of data collected 
(quantitative, qualitative, detailed examples, etc.). The reports produced and the 
audiences that they reach (UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, civil society 
which use reports in advocacy, etc.) are significant in shaping debates and ideas, 
notwithstanding the Rapporteur’s lack of capacity for enforcement or sanctions.35  
 
Comments in the Rapporteur’s 2019 report illustrate the type of analysis undertaken, 
issues raised, and the challenge involved in moving to implementation:  
 
Freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression are closely interrelated 
and mutually reinforcing rights when they are exercised in the legal framework 
established by international human rights law. Both rights are fundamental to a 
democratic society and individual self-fulfillment and are foundational to the 
enjoyment of human rights.  
(UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 2019: 15) 
 
Cases presented illustrate the fact ‘that measures for addressing the challenges posed by 
expression involving religion or belief are open to abuse and can be counterproductive, 
oftentimes victimizing adherents of myriad religions and beliefs in their application’ (ibid.). 
Approximately 58 per cent of the 665 communications transmitted by special 
rapporteurs on FoRB to UN Member States since 2004 have addressed the relationship 
 
34  Examples of conclusions in the Rapporteur’s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief include, on the right to 
conversion: ‘The right to change religion is absolute and is not subject to any limitation whatsoever. Any legislation 
that would prohibit or limit the right to change one’s religion would be contrary to international human rights 
standards and the provisions mentioned above’ (United Nations 2011: 10). The section focuses on the often 
controversial issue of proselytising and possible forms of ‘unethical’ conversion. The Rapporteur’s comment is that: 
‘While some of these acts may not enjoy protection under human rights law’, they should be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. ‘Adoption of laws criminalizing in abstracto certain acts leading to “unethical” conversion should be 
avoided…’ (ibid.).  
 





between freedoms of expression and of conscience, religion, or belief. The report notes 
many reports that detail  
 
surveillance, intimidation, harassment, prosecution, threats of bodily harm, torture 
or murder following acts that had exceeded the limits imposed by law or social 
convention on peaceful manifestations of thoughts, conscience, and religion or 
belief, and/or that had offended the sensitivities of others by denigrating what 
they held sacred.  
(ibid.: 3) 
 
Examples of restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression for reasons relating to 
religion or belief are provided, thus illustrating justifications offered for imposing 
them. Recommendations note that international law compels Member States to pursue a 
restrained approach in addressing tensions between freedom of expression and freedom 
of religion or belief, relying on criteria for limitations that recognise the rights of all persons 
to the freedoms of expression and manifestation of religion or belief (ibid.: 15). 
 
Figure 1: Human rights and FoRB: approaches and relationships 
 
 
Human rights: interactions and intersections: freedom of 
expression including questions involving religious conflicts, 
addressing religious intolerance and extremism; right to life, 
liberty; prohibition of torture and other cruel and denigrating 
treatment or punishment
Anti-discriminatory behaviours: 
discrimination on the basis of 
religion or belief, interreligious 
discrimination/tolerance; 
gender discrimination based on 
religious teachings; favouritism 
towards a state religion
Equitable and supportive 
aproaches to vulnerable 
groups: women, persons 
deprived of liberty, refugees, 




legislative issues, defenders 
of freedom of religion or 
belief and non-
governmental organisations
Freedom of religion or belief: 
Freedom to adopt, change, 
or renounce a religion or 
belief; freedom from 
coercion; the right to 
manifest one's religion or 
belief (worship places, 
holidays, appointing clergy, 













Source: This diagram draws on a visual presentation in the 2011 UN Rapporteur’s digest  
on FoRB, which in turn is a digest of the more extensive listing of aspects of the right to 
FoRB set out in an annexe to the January 2006 UN ECOSOC document Civil and Political 
Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance.    
 
2.1.2 US Department of State reports on religious freedom 
 
Annual country reports by the US Department of State provide a continuing set of 
information about the status of religious freedom, with a common focus on violations and 
other issues arising. These reports, now with a two-decade history, provide a unique set of 
documentation that is primarily specific to each country context but in the aggregate 
provide a basis for analysis over time and comparisons among countries and regions. The 
reports are an important source for other reporting approaches. Objectives include 
assuring a continuing focus on religious freedom issues by US diplomats as well as to 
encourage systematic contact between embassy personnel and a country’s religious 
communities, thus promoting religious engagement. The reports spotlight examples of 
government and societal action that typify and illuminate issues reported in each country. 
The effort is ambitious, addressing all countries each year. They are not designed to 
provide an in-depth analysis of a country’s religious situation or to signal, by omissions or 
inclusions, that a particular case is of greater or lesser importance, or that a case of 
violations is the only available example. Rather the aim is to focus on series of abuses, 
offering a basis for engagement.  
 
The US stands out among nations for the formality of its approach to religious freedom 
(Annexe 3). The annual reporting system by the US Department of State complies with 
section 102(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, by submitting an 
annual report to Congress on the state of religious freedom around the world. The reports 
(the most recent was submitted on 10 June 202036) are currently comprised of separate 
reports on individual countries. These follow a common format but vary in coverage and 
detail, in large part reflecting an assessment of the significance of religious freedom 
issues both by the embassy concerned and by the Office of the Ambassador for 
International Religious Freedom. The length and level of analytic detail reflect the severity 
of concerns about FoRB, population size, and the demands of a country’s religious 
administration. No other country has a system for analysis and reporting that is as broad 
and formalised, which encourages readership. The reports serve as a major source for the 
influential Pew Research Center rating process (see Section 2.2.1). The process has 
 






become better defined over time. An objective for the process is to encourage systematic 
contact between embassy personnel and a country’s religious communities. 
The process of report preparation centres on US embassies. An annotated version of 
previous years’ reports is sent to each embassy, with general guidance and specific 
suggestions for each country, along with a classified communique with standardised 
instructions. Each embassy prepares initial drafts of country chapters based on 
information gathered from government officials, religious groups, NGOs, journalists, 
human rights monitors, academics, media, and others. The collection of data relies on the 
strength of relationships on the ground and frequent communication and consultation 
with local field staff. Collecting first-hand in-country data is limited in countries where 
people might face risks if they communicate with the US government. Here, Department 
of State officials rely on secondary sources.  
 
The Office of International Religious Freedom, based in Washington DC at the 
Department of State, collects and analyses additional information, drawing on 
consultations with foreign government officials, domestic and foreign religious groups, 
domestic and foreign NGOs, multilateral and other international and regional 
organisations, journalists, academic experts, community leaders, and other relevant US 
government institutions. To ensure that reports are comprehensive and to reduce bias, 
multiple sources are used as far as possible. In recent reports, ‘opinion’ statements have 
been removed, including whether a country’s freedoms improved, stayed the same, or 
declined.  
 
It is well understood that the reports cannot capture all developments, particularly topics 
researchers are unaware of or cannot cover due to sheer quantity. Internal networks and 
levels and standards of religious literacy are thus important in allowing writers and 
reviewers to highlight areas of particular significance and fill in data gaps. 
Notwithstanding significant efforts, data will always be subject to a certain amount of 
political judgement, particularly where there are contested questions. Reports are limited 
by the availability and accessibility of information, and one interviewee observed that 
some embassies are more forthright than others. An overall assessment is that the 
reports carry significant weight, informing US foreign policy and serving as the foundation 
for prominent rankings and indices (see the European Parliament FoRB group, for 












The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent US 
government advisory body also established by the 1998 legislation (Annexe 3), monitors 
violations of religious freedom abroad and makes policy recommendations to the 
president, Secretary of State, and Congress. USCIRF focuses on a limited number of 
countries that meet standards for Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs). USCIRF reports 
describe research conducted over the course of a year by USCIRF commissioners and 
staff through travel, meetings, briefings, and other research. In contrast to the 
Department of State reports, which are more subject to diplomatic and political 
constraints, USCIRF’s annual reports ‘unflinchingly’ describe violations of international 
religious freedom.38 Furthermore, unlike the Department of State’s reports, USCIRF’s 
commissioners, who approve the reports by a majority vote, have the option of including 
a statement reflecting their individual views. In addition to featuring select prisoners of 
conscience in individual country chapters, USCIRF’s annual reports also feature prisoners 
in the report appendices, putting a human face to the myriad religious freedom violations 
perpetrated and tolerated by state and nonstate actors.39 To illustrate, the October 2019 
listing of recommended CPCs was: Burma, China, Eritrea, India, Iran, Nigeria, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. An 
additional category is a ‘Special Watch List’ for countries that fall short of the level of 
concern indicated by the CPC designation. Among the 15 countries on this list were 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Indonesia, Egypt, and Cuba. Several 
non-state actors are also cited as meriting concern and are being followed. 
 
Decisions on action following the reports from the Ambassador for Religious Freedom 
and USCIRF (including sanctions) are taken by the US president, with the Secretary of 
State acting on his behalf. 
 
2.1.4 OSCE/ODIHR 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – ODIHR Hate Crime 
Reporting (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights). The Observatory on 
Intolerance and Discrimination Against Christians in Europe40  
 
ODIHR (as part of OSCE) gathers official data on hate crimes, with the objective of 
helping participating countries to identify needed responses. OSCE – ODIHR provides 
 
38  See the USCIRF annual reports webpage. 
39  See USCIRF Releases New Report about Religious Prisoners in Turkmenistan’s Gulag. 
 






regular guidance and training for civil society groups on hate crime monitoring, and 
claims result in observed improvements in the quality and level of detail of information 
received from civil society. The information, as currently collected and compiled, does 
not, however, support direct comparisons, as reporting is not consistent across countries 
and does not capture all hate crimes 
 
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), originally the Office for 
Free Elections, was created in 1990 and established in 1991 as an OSCE institution, 
tasked by participating states to serve as a collection point for information, statistics and 
legislation on hate crimes, as well as on best practices in addressing hate crime, and to 
make this information publicly available with a view to defining the priorities of the OSCE 
in this area. A website is part of the work to achieve ODIHR’s mandate in an accessible 
and transparent way. 41 More specifically, ODIHR provides support, assistance, and 
expertise to participating states and civil society, to promote democracy, rule of law, 
human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination. It conducts training programmes for 
government and law enforcement officials and NGOs on how to uphold, promote, and 
monitor human rights. Since 2006, ODIHR has reported on hate crimes, serving as a 
‘collecting point for information and statistics collected by participating States’. It makes 
its findings publicly available through TANDIS42 and reports on challenges and responses 
to hate-motivated incidents in the OSCE region. OSCE is expected to take the reports into 
account in deciding on OSCE priorities in the area of tolerance.  
 
The methodology draws on an officialised reporting system, which ODIHR characterised 
in a 2019 report as a diagnostic approach to the collection of hate crime data.43 
Governments (57 participating countries) provide official hate crime data received from  
civil society and international organisations and the Holy See report hate incidents. 
National Points of Contact on Combating Hate Crimes (NPCs), appointed by the 
governments of participating states, provide much of the data. ODIHR issues calls for 
submissions44 detailing what is requested from civil society organisations. To be 
considered a hate crime, the offence must meet two criteria: the act must constitute an 
offence under criminal law; and it must have been motivated by bias. Bias motivations 
are broadly defined as preconceived negative opinions, stereotypical assumptions, 
intolerance, or hatred directed to a particular group that shares a common characteristic, 
 
41  See the OSCE/ODIHR mandate.  
42  See TANDIS (Tolerance and Non-discrimination Information System) website.  
43  See ODIHR’s Impact in 2019: Supporting a Diagnostic Approach to Hate Crime Data Collection.  






such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, gender, or any 
other fundamental characteristic. NPCs fill out a web-based questionnaire which covers: 
data-collection methods, legislation, reported hate crime data, policies and initiatives, 
and notable cases. ODIHR contacts NPCs to verify incidents and include background 
information in the report. ODIHR analyses reported data and information to assess 
whether it can be included in the report, following two basic rules: the crime, activity or 
change in the law must have taken place during the relevant year; and the information 
must fall within OSCE’s definition of a hate crime. Cases reported by civil society, 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), and the Holy See are recorded and published as 
‘incidents’ as opposed to ‘crimes’. Information reported by civil society groups must relate 
to criminal incidents committed with a bias motivation and must have taken place within 
the relevant time frame. Incident reports are accompanied by the relevant source, which 
sometimes includes more than one organisation. The goal is to have multiple sources 
verify the incident, but that is not always possible. Civil society incidents are not 
necessarily comparable to officially recorded hate crimes.  
 
IGOs submit incidents reported by a number of field offices. All incidents reported by IGOs 
are reviewed and must fall within the OSCE’s definition of hate crime and the relevant 
time frame. ODIHR formally requests information from OSCE field operations, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM). Research also identifies and summarises reports from the United 
Nations Human Rights Council; the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC); the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD 
Committee); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the European Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA); the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI); the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights; and the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Holy See reports on incidents based on bias against 
Christians in other countries. A review process involves participating states and other 
contributors, and NPCs are consulted about the presentation of their country information 
before it is published on the website.  
 
Reports are published annually online on the International Day for Tolerance (16 
November), with information disaggregated by type of crime, bias motivation, and 
country. Statistical incidents are presented as numbers, disaggregated by country, bias 
motivation, and type of incident, which appear in the overview of incidents provided for 
each state, but are not included in the descriptive tables. Incident descriptions comprise 
detailed descriptions as submitted to ODIHR, which are reviewed, summarised, and 





includes ODIHR key observations, based on the commitments on hate crime by the 
participating states. 
 
Some data come from hate incidents reported to ODIHR by civil society organisations, 
but sources and processes used to gather other data are not clearly defined. It is thus 
unclear whether coverage is as wide as the website presentation suggests. The 2019 
report notes that the number of reported hate crimes does not always provide a full 
picture of the state of different religious traditions in Europe. Overall, incidents that qualify 
for inclusion in the hate crime report constitute a small fraction of the intolerance, 
discrimination, and legal restrictions Christians face in some European countries.45  
 
In sum, the limited scope of the report and some of the examples used for Christian 
persecution, such as a pharmacist being sanctioned for refusing to sell an IUD, a midwife 
refusing to participate in abortions, or a nurse fined for preventing doctors from giving a 
lethal injection, reflect some shortcomings. These and other examples may be at odds 
with other minority rights or represent highly politicised situations, suggesting some 
political bias in the line of inquiry.46 
 
2.1.5 European Parliament Intergroup on FoRB & RT 
 
A group of Members of the European Parliament (the European Parliament Intergroup on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance – FoRB & RT)47 monitors and 
advocates for FoRB and religious tolerance, based on research and reported violations. 
An especially significant approach to methodologies to accomplish this was employed for 
the 2017 report, which drew on the work of an expert consortium of researchers. Previous 
reports and those following have taken a broader approach, focusing internationally and 
on initiatives by the European Union (EU). The fourth, 2017 report, however, developed an 
interesting and useful methodology. The team developed a specific set of indicators and 
criteria that sought to demonstrate in which countries severe violations of FoRB occur 
and where EU promotion and protection of FoRB might produce the most effective 
outcomes. The sensitivity of the EU’s influence in each country and that country’s 
relevance for the EU were assessed, as the basis for calculation of a specific ‘focalness 
score’ for each country covered, focused on five FoRB dimensions. Shortlisted countries 
were assessed by a set of legal standards that calculated a score out of ten on the state 
 
45  See, for example, notes from an OSCE meeting.  
46  And, for example, raises questions as to the responsibilities of pharmacists, midwives, and doctors to their patients 







of FoRB violations. Several other countries that were severe FoRB violators were also 
included. The goal was to support ‘tangible, feasible, and practical proposals that 
encourage EU policymakers and incentivise our bilateral country partners to engage in, 
promote and protect Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance more 
effectively’. In short, the goal was to provide the FoRB and RT Intergroup and EU decision 
makers at large with policy-relevant advice.48 
 
2.1.6 OIC Islamophobia Observatory 
 
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) established an Islamophobia Observatory 
in 2007, located in its Directorate of Cultural, Social, and Family Affairs.  It monitors and 
publishes indicators of the magnitude and state of Islamophobia across the world, 
publishing several reports, monthly bulletins, and research articles in OIC journals on 
incidents of discrimination, hate crimes, and stigmatisation of Muslims as intolerant, 
radicals, violent, and terrorists across the world. The methodology employed is described 
as ‘monitoring events and incidents on [a] daily basis; scanning the minds, public feelings, 
incidents, and everything that serves as possible indicator of Islamophobia’.49 Sources 
cited in the twelfth report (2019) are largely media reports of incidents.50 The focus is on 
Europe, North America, and Australia. The context is to address Islamophobia as a 
legitimate response of the Muslim world. The Observatory reports to the Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) of OIC member states, which has responded to 
the issues raised at different levels. OIC is also addressing this issue at a global level. A 
research review concludes that the effort has helped to make Islamophobia part of the 
international discourse of human rights, known as a social evil (Naseem and Hafeez 
2017).  
 
2.2 Non-government methodologies and analysis 
 
2.2.1 Pew Research Center 
 
Among the most widely cited estimates of levels of violations of religious freedom and 
trends are the Pew Research Center’s periodic assessments of religious restrictions 
around the world. The assessments draw on a careful and well-articulated methodology 
that relies on secondary sources, and which focus on monitoring and reporting on trends 
over time in violations. 
 
48  A detailed report on the methodology used for the 2017 report.  
49  See Islamophobia Observatory.  





The Pew Research Center (a Washington DC-based think tank or, the term it uses, ‘fact 
tank’) began issuing annual quantitative reports on trends in religious freedom in 2009. 
The approach built on a methodology that Brian Grim and Professor Roger Finke 
developed while at Penn State University’s Association of Religion Data Archives (Grim 
and Finke 2006). The goals have been to devise quantifiable, objective, and transparent 
measures of the extent to which governments and societal groups impinge on the 
practice of religion and to rate countries and self-governing territories on two indexes that 
are reproducible and can be periodically updated. The purpose is to allow a finer-grained 
understanding of FoRB conditions within a given country. From 2012, the assessments 
aim to measure the extent to which governments (first) and societal groups (second) 
impinge on the practice of religion with ratings of countries and self-governing territories. 
In 2017, Pew issued a ten-year review that focused on the overall situation and on trends 
(Pew Research Center 2019). 
 
The annual reports code narrative data from 20 government and NGO reports51 into 
quantitative indicators to create a ‘systematic assessment and comparison of restrictions 
on religion worldwide’. Pew methodology is rigorous and transparent, based on social 
science, detailed in its annual reports. Pew has two ten-point indexes: the Government 
Restrictions Index (GRI) and the Social Hostilities Index (SHI). GRI measures how a 
government’s laws, policies, and concrete actions restrict religion in a given country while 
the SHI measures religion-related acts of hostility perpetrated by non-governmental 
actors and groups. The two indices each include several sub-categories. Report 
presentations are accompanied by well-designed graphs, charts, and tables. 
 
The trends make clear that government restrictions and social hostilities are generally 
mutually reinforcing; GRI and SHI scores are generally roughly similar, with some outliers 
(e.g. China and Vietnam have ‘low’ or ‘moderate’ SHI but ‘very high’ GRI). Japan and 
Taiwan score ‘low’ in both indexes while Pakistan and Egypt score ‘very high’ on both. 
Several countries that actively promote FoRB as part of their foreign policy do not score 
high on religious tolerance domestically: Germany, Denmark, the UK, and the US have 
‘high’ social hostilities involving religion and ‘moderate’ government restrictions, 
according to the Pew data (Birdsall and Beaman 2020). 
 
Aggregating the country data makes possible analysis of FoRB conditions at the 
continental and global level. The MENA region, for example, has consistently ranked far 
worse than all other regions on both GRI and SHI, while the Americas rank lowest on both 
indexes. At the global level, the median SHI is 2.1 and the GRI is 2.8.  
 





The Pew methodology relies on primary sources,52 with a heavy weight to the US 
Department of State’s annual reports on International Religious Freedom. Reports from 
independent NGOs and a variety of European and UN bodies are also used. Five coders 
consult the primary sources and two additional sources for the US (which is not included 
in the Department of State’s annual reports on International Religious Freedom).53 The 
Department of State’s annual reports on International Religious Freedom are thus a major 
source. Other sources provide additional factual detail used to settle ambiguities, resolve 
contradictions, and help in the proper scoring of each question. Most countries and 
territories analysed by the Pew Research Center were multi-sourced; only small 
(predominantly island) countries had a single source, namely the Department of State 
reports. Pew Research Center staff generally found few cases in which one source 
contradicted another. When contradictions did arise the source that cited the most 
specific documentation is used. Pew coders (trained for the purpose) review sources for 
specific policies and actions and assign scores based on a series of standardised 
questions, which are then used to calculate index ratings.  
 
The Pew rating system focuses on tracking trends. There is thus an effort to maintain the 
same sources and to stick generally to a specific set of questions. In relying on outside 
sources, Pew is limited to what is covered in the documents they choose to review, which 
are subject to their own methodological biases. The thresholds for various categories 
were set in Pew’s inaugural 2009 report (using 2007 data) with the top 5 per cent of 
countries in the SHI and GRI indexes labelled as ‘very high’. ‘High’ countries were the next 
15 per cent, with GRI scores from 4.5 to 6.5 and SHI scores from 3.6 to 7.1. Pew kept this 
2007 baseline in subsequent years. Thus, in the 2019 report, for all countries, a GRI of 6.6 
or above was classified as ‘very high’, although 14 per cent of countries (27 of 198) fell 
into that classification as of 2017.  
 
Pew researchers (in interview discussions) observed that if something is not in a 
document, they cannot code for it. This might indicate an improvement when there is 
 
52  These are: (1) Country constitutions; (2) US State Department annual reports on International Religious Freedom; (3) 
US Commission on International Religious Freedom annual reports; (4) UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief reports; (5) Human Rights First reports in first and second years of coding; (Freedom House reports 
in subsequent years of coding); (6) Human Rights Watch topical reports; (7) International Crisis Group country 
reports; (8) United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office annual report on human rights; (9) Council of the 
European Union annual report on human rights; (10) Global Terrorism Database; (11) European Network Against 
Racism Shadow Reports; (12) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports; (13) US State Department 
annual Country Reports on Terrorism; (14) Anti-Defamation League reports; (15) US State Department Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices; (16) Uppsala University’s Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Armed Conflict 
Database; (17) Human Rights Without Frontiers ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief’ newsletters. These are listed for 
2013, but do not change by year. For further information, see Methodology. 





none. Their report’s goal is not to measure religious freedom, but rather restrictions in a 
country. This focus on negative dynamics and developments may overlook 
improvements and thus fail to capture the entire picture of religious freedom or belief. 
Coding also restricts analysis and excludes systematic efforts to assess underlying value 
questions: no matter what the motivation, a restriction is coded as a restriction. The 
methodology nonetheless allows for more consistency between years and countries, 
which is thus more readily used for comparative purposes and tracking trends.  
 
The Pew finding that 83 per cent of people live in countries with ‘high’ or ‘very high’ levels 
of religious restrictions (GRI or SHI) has been cited often, at times in ways that distort the 
topic (despite Pew’s careful explanations and qualifications). Judd Birdsall and Lori 
Beaman (2020) explore the significance of these ratings, notably because they are so 
often employed in policy and activist discourse to paint a picture of ‘a world ablaze with 
persecution’, with more than eight in ten of the earth’s inhabitants actively suffering for 
their beliefs. The figures do not purport to show the number of people who suffer directly, 
nor the degree.  
 
The Birdsall/Beaman (2020) critique focuses on the way the figure is used as well as on its 
accuracy; many of the numbers resulting from the methodology are problematic in 
various respects. Pew’s caveat follows the sentence with the 83 per cent figure directly. It 
is important to note, however, that these restrictions and hostilities do not necessarily 
affect the religious groups and citizens of these countries equally, as certain groups or 
individuals – especially religious minorities – may be targeted more frequently by these 
policies and actions than others.54 It makes clear that the actual proportion of the world’s 
population that is affected by high levels of religious restrictions may be considerably 
lower than 83 per cent.  
 
The Birdsall/Beaman critique highlights scores that ‘seem to defy lived experience’. 
Singapore’s GRI rank, for example, was worse than Myanmar, Sudan, Brunei, and 
Pakistan. Russia was ranked above Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea. Spain was 
in the ‘high’ bracket, above ‘moderate’ countries like Somalia, Libya, and Niger. Portugal, 
despite its cultural and legal similarities with Spain, was ranked ‘low’. The US received a 
higher GRI score than Cambodia, Poland, and Cameroon, and was just three places 
below Hungary. The UK was ranked worse than Burundi and the Central African Republic. 
In the SHI sub-category (social hostilities related to religious norms), Germany was ranked 
 
54  The 2020 Pew report on restrictions highlights the global decade-long rise in government restrictions. In 2018, the 
global median level of government restrictions on religion – that is, laws, policies and actions by officials that 
impinge on religious beliefs and practices – continued to climb, reaching an all-time high since the Pew Research 





worst in the world – above India and Somalia. France, Italy, and the UK were also ranked 
in the top ten. Israel was ranked above Afghanistan (the hostilities were very different: the 
Taliban threatened or killed disfavoured clerics while ultra-Orthodox Jews insulted and 
spat on taxi drivers working on the Sabbath). GRI and SHI scores have doubtful utility if 
they do not reflect common experience. Pew does caution that two countries with similar 
GRI scores ‘does not mean that the lived experience of someone in those two countries is 
similar with respect to government restrictions on religion’,55 but including debatable 
incidents is problematic and highlights core problems with the methodology itself. 
 
An example of how high figures are used, potentially polarising perceptions and 
undermining core understandings of the complex issues involved is President Trump’s 
September 2019 speech at the United Nations on religious freedom: ‘Regrettably, the 
religious freedom enjoyed by American citizens is rare in the world. Approximately 80 per 
cent of the world’s population live in countries where religious liberty is threatened, 
restricted, or even banned. And when I heard that number, I said, “Please go back and 
check it because it can’t possibly be correct”. And, sadly, it was. Eighty per cent’.56 
 
2.2.2 Religion and State database 
 
A different methodology is the Religion and State (RAS) project, led by Professor 
Jonathan Fox and located at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel.57 A university-based 
project, it aims to create a set of measures that ‘systematically gauge the intersection 
between government and religion’, with a focus on government religion policy. The goals 
are: (a) to provide an accurate description of government religion policies worldwide; (b) 
to create a tool which will lead to greater understanding of the factors which influence 
government religion policy; and (c) to provide the means to examine how government 
religion policy influences other political, social, and economic factors as well as how those 
factors influence government religion policy.  
 
Round 3 of the RAS data set, the official version currently available for download, 
 
55  This is a qualification from the 2020 methodology materials on the Pew Research Center website that alludes to 
possible distortions: ‘Although the 198 countries and territories vary widely in size, population, wealth, ethnic 
diversity, religious makeup and form of government, the study does not attempt to adjust for such differences. Poor 
countries are not scored differently on the indexes than wealthy ones. Countries with diverse ethnic and religious 
populations are not “expected” to have more social hostilities than countries with more homogeneous populations. 
And democracies are not assessed more leniently or harshly than authoritarian regimes.’ 
56  See ‘Remarks by President Trump at the United Nations Event on Religious Freedom’. 
  





measures the extent of government religion policy for 183 states and independent 
entities on a yearly basis between 1990 and 2014. All countries with populations of 
250,000 or more as well as a sampling of smaller states are thus included. A new module 
on societal discrimination is also included. RAS includes the following information: 
 
• Official religion: A 15 value variable which measures the official relationship 
between religion and the state. This includes five categories of official religions and 
nine categories of state–religion relationships which range from unofficial support 
for a single religion to overt hostility to all religion. 
• Religious support: 52 separate variables which measure different ways a 
government can support religion including financial support, policies which 
enforce religious laws, and other forms of entanglement between government and 
religion. 
• Religious restrictions: 29 separate variables which measure different ways 
governments regulate, restrict, or control all religions in the state including the 
majority religion. This includes restrictions on religion’s political role, restrictions on 
religious institutions, restrictions on religious practices, and other forms of 
regulation, control, and restrictions. 
• Religious discrimination: 36 types of restrictions that are placed on religious 
institutions and practices of religious minorities that are not placed on the majority 
group. This includes restrictions on religious practices, restrictions on religious 
institutions and clergy, restrictions on conversion and proselytising, and other 
restrictions. 
• The data set includes several sets of detailed variables measuring certain policies 
in depth. These topics include religious education, the registration of religious 
organisations, restrictions on abortion, restrictions on proselytising, and religious 
requirements for holding public office or citizenship. 
• Societal discrimination: 27 types of actions taken against religious minorities by 
actors in society who do not represent the government. This includes economic 
discrimination, speech acts, property crimes, nonviolent harassment, and 
violence. 
• Minority societal actions: This includes five types of acts taken by minorities 
against the majority group or other minorities (coded separately) including 
violence, terrorism, harassment, and vandalism.58 
Drawing on this data and on earlier research,59 Fox explores what he terms the contested 
 
58  Ibid. 





understandings of religious freedom, arguing in essence that many understandings are 
contradictory and that few meet commonly employed standards. 
 
In his contextual analysis of FoRB respect and violations, Fox (2020a) examines several 
categories:  
 
(i) Free exercise of religion: (he relates this to the US constitution’s first amendment), 
governments may not restrict the free practice of religion including the right to 
create and manage independent religious institutions. It does not limit enforcing 
religious laws which do not directly contradict the religion of a minority.  
(ii) Bans on religious persecution and repression: all freedoms included in the free 
exercise conception and a ban on any form of restriction specifically on religious 
minorities.  
(iii) Religious tolerance: giving equal rights to religious minorities. In the context of 
religious freedom, this means to guarantee the same rights and freedoms to 
religious minorities as are granted to the majority. 
(iv) Absolute separationism: This would ban any government entanglement with 
religion: the government may neither support nor restrict religion in any way. This 
model (the US is considered the architype), requires separation of religion and state 
but not separation of religion and politics.  
(v) Neutrality: This focuses on equal treatment for all religions: a ‘level playing field’. 
Government must support all religions equally. If one religion receives a form of 
support so must all the others. Selective support puts the non-supported religion at 
a disadvantage.  
(vi) Laicism: This (from France’s religion policy) is perhaps the most extreme type of 
secularism found in democracies, forbidding state support for any religion and 
restricting expressions of religion in public. Religion is considered a private matter 
that should not intrude into the secular public sphere.  
 
Fox’s analysis and data set are rigorous and provide more granular measures of different 
forms of restrictions than other methodologies commonly in use. They have wide and 
systematic country coverage. The underlying analysis and bold conclusion as to the wide 
limitations on ‘total’ religious freedom highlighting internal contradictions are telling.  
 
RAS is widely used, especially in academia (it was designed primarily for academic 
research). It is a useful methodology, especially supporting comparisons across 
numerous cases and highlighting patterns. However, as with any large data set, 
distinctive features of each case and context tend to be lost (a classic trade-off between 





patterns of discrimination against specific religious communities differ from common 
stereotypes and expectations, with relatively high levels of discrimination in some 
Christian-majority countries that pride themselves on respect for human rights as well as 
differing levels of discrimination among religious groups (Fox 2020b, 2016). This 
underscores the diversity and complexity of state/religion relationships and the difficulty 
in attaining the often assumed ideal of FoRB.60 The methodology provides a framework 
both for operational analysis and dialogue about the rationale and justification for 
different forms of restrictions. 
 
2.3 Methodologies relying on primary sources 
 
2.3.1 Open Doors61  
 
World Watch Research (WWR), the research unit of Open Doors,62 annually prepares a 
World Watch List, which reports and ranks global persecution of Christians. It thus 
represents a methodology used by a non-state actor. WWR63 has gathered data about 
different types of hostilities against Christians for many years, using it as guidance for 
Open Doors’ (OD) fieldwork as well as by OD Development Offices, mainly to sensitise 
their Christian constituencies, and encourage them to pray and give financial support for 
the ‘persecuted Church’. Other religious freedom professionals are an additional 
audience. OD Development Offices have broadened their reach in recent years toward 
the secular public, with their data used widely in the political sphere, at national and 
international levels. OD data analysis points to patterns of gender-specific persecution.  
 
The annual World Watch List is a comprehensive annual research project on the status of 
freedom of religion worldwide. It is focused on measuring the situation of Christians64 and 
 
60  Direct or indirect discrimination linked to an individual’s or a community’s religion or belief is contrary to 
international human rights law; from the perspective of the individual or community involved, understanding the 
ultimate motivation of the discriminating party may seem irrelevant.  
 
61  Draws on a draft paper by Dr Matthew Rees, Dr Thomas Müller and Frans Veerman, ‘Highlighting the Dark Corners 
of Persecution’. 
62  Open Doors is an international, Christian, non-denominational charity founded in 1955 to support persecuted 
Christians. 
63  World Watch Research is the research department of Open Doors International, but free in its findings and results, 
which are presented at Open Doors Analytical (Password: freedom).  






published as a ranking of 73 countries65 with corresponding country dossiers,66 detailing 
the situation of Christians in each country. The underlying research follows a detailed 
methodology,67 which has at its heart a questionnaire with 84 questions grouped in six 
spheres (five spheres of life and violence). Spheres of life follow the shape of freedom of 
religion as guaranteed in Article 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR: Private life (in freedom of 
religion terminology mainly: forum internum), Family life, Community life, National life, 
and Church life (comprising the collective dimension of freedom of religion). The analysis 
is grounded in a good understanding of any given country. Systemic questions about a 
country’s persecution engines, drivers of persecution, and categories of Christian 
communities convey a sense of the situation on the ground. 
 
WWR categorises nine persecution engines (in practice, these often occur in blended 
ways, but one engine is usually dominant): Islamic oppression, Religious nationalism, 
Ethno-religious hostility, Clan oppression, Christian denominational protectionism, 
Communist and post-Communist oppression, Secular intolerance, Dictatorial paranoia, 
and Organised Corruption and Crime. WWR has also developed a list of 12 drivers, 
including not just typical actors of persecution, such as state authorities and religious 
radical groups, but also groups such as political parties, ordinary citizens, or one’s own 
(extended) family. As with the engines, more than one driver of persecution is usually 
active, producing a ‘persecution matrix’. Four categories of Christian communities are 
typified: communities of expatriate Christians (including migrant workers), historical 
Christian communities and/or government-controlled churches, converts to Christianity, 
and non-traditional Christian communities. In any given country, different engines and 
persecutors targeting different categories of Christian communities are the focus. This 
can vary by region, adding further layers of complexity.68 
 
Experts who are independent of OD, OD field staff, and the WWR analysts are the 
respondents to the questionnaire. Answers feed into a scoring process and finally into 
production of the World Watch List. Country dossiers reflect their insights, thus presenting 
a picture of persecution. The complete World Watch List 2020 documentation 
encompasses approximately 2,500 pages.69 Questionnaires are completed by key contacts 
 
65  It is 73 countries for World Watch List 2020, but this can vary as all countries are included which cross the threshold 
of scoring 41 points or more. See WWR 2020: Compilation of All Main Documents. 
66  Open Doors Analytical: Country Dossiers (last accessed 18 April 2020). See also How the Scoring Works. 
67  See Watch List Documentation, sub-section methodology (last accessed 18 April 2020). 
68  For example, see the Country Dossiers on Ethiopia; Myanmar; or China (last accessed 18 April 2020). 





in countries who gather data in various ways, drawing on different networks. The data-
gathering process thus has a ‘grass-roots’ character. The field stream questionnaire, 
together with input from several external experts who provide a cross-check for the 
results, form the basis for the country scores. The persecution analysts of WWR then put 
all the information together, giving feedback to the respondents and following up their 
responses. 
 
This method of data-gathering is in large measure at the discretion of those gathering the 
information. Reliance on ‘key contacts’ and the various approaches for obtaining data 
from them provides flexibility and ‘listens to’ local voices. However, lack of 
standardisation makes the results hard to generalise and compare. Relying on ‘key 
contacts’ (whose selection is not clearly defined) may give an incomplete view of a 
country. Furthermore, the questionnaire, on which scoring is based, is not always used. 
 
WWR monitors Christian persecution using a three-step approach: first, information 
gathered online (Global Country Scan); second, a short questionnaire (World Watch 
Survey or Vulnerability Assessment Tool); and then the longer questionnaire. For data 
verification, external experts and OD crosscheck the completed questionnaires. The final 
results are audited every year by the International Institute for Religious Freedom (IIRF). 
The resulting report has specific scores for different ‘persecution profiles’ and a short 
country overview and ‘prayer points’.  
 
2.3.2 Minority Rights Group (MRG)70 
 
Minority Rights Group (MRG), a relatively small organisation with around 40 staff and a 
50-year history, has a focused mandate: ‘to secure the rights of minority and indigenous 
communities around the world and to improve cooperation between communities’ 
(Thomas 2009). It works to empower minority and indigenous communities to be aware 
of and to demand fulfilment of their rights to equality in all areas of life. Activities include 
training minority activists, and support for advocacy campaigns and legal cases to bring 
about policy changes and implementation. While MRG is primarily a human rights 
organisation, it works in an interdisciplinary fashion, drawing on knowledge and 
experience of international development, conflict prevention and resolution, and diversity 
and equity. Its primary focus is not on FoRB per se, but the topic is woven through its 
analysis and work. 
 
MRG has produced a World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, with profiles 
of minority communities in all countries. It has also published reports, formerly annually, 
 





such as the State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, and an annual 
index, Peoples Under Threat, ranking countries according to the degree of physical 
danger facing communities.71 Current publications focus on trend analysis. The online 
directory of minorities and indigenous peoples grew out of MRG’s encyclopaedic World 
Directory of Minorities, which was first published in 1990 and updated and expanded in 
1997. It has been restructured into database format, updated, and expanded. The full 
text is available, geared to all with an interest in any aspect of minorities and indigenous 
peoples, their rights, and their historical, political or geographical context.  
 
The MRG website observes that obtaining accurate statistics on the size of minority 
populations is difficult. Many states do not disaggregate data on ethnic grounds, for a 
variety of historical and political reasons, and many lack reliable or up-to-date census 
figures. Estimates and sources are provided as far as possible, relying on widely cited and 
reputable publications. However, where there are genuinely no official figures available, 
MRG falls back on widely circulated estimates. MRG endeavours to identify the sources of 
statistics it uses in its work. MRG thus engages the methodological challenges of 
assembling reliable information about groups where information is difficult to obtain.  
 
Identifying situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has been an MRG 
objective, especially since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. MRG draws on comparative 
studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing, including 
quantitative longitudinal analysis to allow the testing of different causal hypotheses. 
Professor Barbara Harff, a senior consultant with the US State Failure Task Force, 
developed a model that identifies six preconditions that make it possible to distinguish, 
with 74 per cent accuracy, between internal wars and regime collapses in the 1955–97 
period, those that did, and those that did not, lead to genocide and political mass murder 
(politicide): political upheaval; previous genocides or politicides; exclusionary ideology of 
the ruling elite; autocratic nature of the regime; minority character of the ruling elite; and 
low trade openness. MRG then constructs the Peoples Under Threat table, specifically 
designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing, or other systematic violent 
repression. This differs from most other early warning tools, which focus on violent conflict 
as such. Its primary application is civilian protection. The table includes indicators of 
conflict, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during 
armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilisation and 
justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that 
enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or 
may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models 
 
71  See World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, 





that focus exclusively on current conflicts. Severe and even violent repression of 
minorities may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for 
larger-scale killing.  
 
Governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of 
genocidal violence, so the state is the basic unit of enquiry. Statistical indicators used all 
relate to the state, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk. Formally, the 
state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the means of violence; where non-state 
actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the 
state’s complicity, or, in a ‘failed state’ situation, where the rule of law has disintegrated. 
Certain state characteristics greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity: habituation to 
illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights 
violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, 
and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing 
targeted principally at one group also involve other groups deliberately decimated or 
destroyed. 
 
MRG has identified groups in each state which they believe to be under most threat, 
though other groups or indeed the general population may also be at some risk. These 
are most often minority groups, though in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will 
also be at risk, and the table lists them in relevant cases. In some cases, all groups in the 
country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing. Various studies have tested and discarded 
the general level of ethnic or cultural diversity in a society as a significant indicator, but 
neither pattern of ethnic diversity that Professor Harff has tested showed any effect on 
the likelihood of mass killing (the minority character of the ruling elite does appear 
significant). Research on relationships between diversity and conflict support these 
findings. 
 
The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators that include indicators of 
democracy or good governance from the World Bank, conflict indicators from the Center 
for Systemic Peace and other leading global conflict research institutes, indicators of 
group division or elite factionalisation (Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace), the State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides, 
and the country credit risk classification published by the OECD (as a proxy for trade 









2.3.3 Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW) 
 
The Jehovah’s Witnesses have developed broad mechanisms to record FoRB-related 
crimes, with the primary goal of care for their members; they do not attempt broader 
monitoring of trends among reported violations. Recording is done by all 86 JW branches, 
worldwide. Each branch monitors any human rights abuses committed against fellow 
believers in any given country, recording all physical acts of violence, verbal threats of 
physical abuse or death threats, and acts of vandalism on houses of worship. General 
insults to their faith or to a person are not recorded. The data thus comes from JW 
sources, with staff of JW’s Office of Public Information trained to monitor human rights 
violations. Local congregations are expected to inform the local office when incidents 
occur. Recording and review of files is done manually; for example, in Russia, violations of 
the right to FoRB began in the early 1990s and are ramping up continuously. JW keeps a 
close record of who is in prison, in pretrial detention, or not able to leave their hometown 
and on some sort of restrictions.72 
 
2.3.4 The Religious Freedom Institute 
 
The Religious Freedom Institute (RFI), a Washington DC-based think tank, conducts a 
limited survey focused on ministries of foreign affairs; it does not address specifically the 
topic of violations of FoRB. Members of the International Contact Group on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief (ICG) are asked to respond to a survey asking about the extent of their 
international religious freedom policy, advocacy, and programming activities. RFI’s 2019 
report Surveying the Landscape of International Religious Freedom Policy drew on a 
survey from November 2018 through spring 2019, though a significant number of ICG 
members did not respond.73  
 
2.4 Observatories and media monitoring methods 
 
2.4.1 General observations 
 
Various initiatives aim to monitor and report on religious violence or on related aspects of 
pluralism, observing incidents as they happen and following closely the media, especially 
online. Facing resource and/or technology restraints, some observatories monitor and 
map media retrospectively. New monitoring projects have entered the field in the past 
few years, using new technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning, 
and relying increasingly on online sources. This shift, particularly in measuring hate 
 
72  See Russia: Escalating Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses.  






speech, reflects the sharply increasing roles of digital media sources in early warning 
efforts, detecting and measuring incitements to violence as their influence grows. Among 
the strengths of active ‘live’ monitoring, over or under exaggerated trends can be 
identified: a country may limit, censor, or manipulate records, the media, or other publicly 
available information, while over-reporting in freer-access countries may saturate and 
thus distort impressions. Under-reporting in countries with more repressive governments 
can obscure important trends by diluting data or curtailing the information available. 
Headline-capturing news may not reflect the most significant or ubiquitous happenings in 
a region – more divisive, controversial, or politically charged events may attract more 
media or research attention than is reflective of their relative scale.  
 
2.4.2 The Centre for the Analysis of Social Media (CASM) 
 
CASM is a joint venture between the University of Sussex and Demos, a think tank.74 Its 
online big data research uses machine learning software for continuous live monitoring of 
social media for hateful, xenophobic, anti-disability, anti-Semitic, and anti-Islamic 
speech. CASM uses a technology platform, Method52, developed in cooperation with the 
University of Sussex, that allows ‘non-technical researchers to analyse very large data 
sets like Twitter’, monitoring speech that is Islamophobic, derogatory, or hateful on social 
media platforms like Twitter. Islamophobic speech, for example, increased noticeably in 
the aftermath of terror attacks (Miller, Smith and Dale 2016). For the purposes of the 
project, Method52 collected tweets from Twitter’s ‘Application Programming Interfaces’ 
(APIs):  
 
Method52 allows researchers to train algorithms to split apart (‘to 
classify’) Tweets into categories, according to the meaning of the 
Tweet, and on the basis of the text they contain. To do this, it uses a 
technology called natural language processing. Natural language 
processing is a branch of artificial intelligence research, and combines 
approaches developed in the fields of computer science, applied 
mathematics, and linguistics. An analyst ‘marks up’ which category he 
or she considers a tweet to fall into, and this ‘teaches’ the algorithm to 
spot patterns in the language use associated with each category 
chosen. The algorithm looks for statistical correlations between the 
language used and the categories assigned to determine the extent to 
which words and bigrams are indicative of the predefined categories. 
(ibid.: 16) 
 





2.4.3 Arab Barometer 
A nonpartisan research network produces the Arab Barometer,  using public opinion 
surveys and quantitative research in MENA countries, to ‘provide insight into the social, 
political, and economic attitudes and values of ordinary citizens across the Arab world’.75 
The mission is to allow the views and voices of ‘ordinary Arab citizens... to inform national 
conversations and policy debates’. The Arab Barometer does not explicitly or 
systematically cover religious minorities or religious freedom, but the issues arise in 
various ways in the course of survey work. 
 
Arab Barometer has conducted surveys since 2006, at least once in 15 countries. Surveys 
were conducted face-to-face in the respondent’s place of residence. Respondents must 
be non-institutionalised and aged 18 or over. Each country surveyed includes about 
2,400 respondents. The error margin for surveys is +/-3%. Sampling limitations are 
acknowledged: ‘By necessity, it does not include some citizens who are inaccessible, 
including those who are in hospitals, care homes, or other collective living arrangements 
such as halls or live at military bases, or are inmates in the country’s prisons. In some 
cases, small populations living in remote areas of the country are excluded from the 
sample.’ Sampling strategy varies by country but ‘it is a requirement that probability 
samples are drawn’. Multistage sampling methods are normally applied, based on 
stratification to better represent certain homogenous groups within a population. The first 
to third waves used Paper and Pencil Interviewing (PAPI); the fourth wave used a multiple 
mode design, with some countries switching to Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing 
(CAPI), with the fifth wave (current) almost exclusively relying on CAPI. Interviewers are 
trained and tested prior to fieldwork and overseen by regional hubs and local team 
leaders. Supervisors sometimes sit in on interviews for assurance. Quality-control checks 
after fieldwork are done with software to detect duplicate observations and 
‘sophisticated tests look for unusual patterns in the data or paradata’. 
 
2.4.4 Latin American Observatory 
 
The mission of the Observatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America (OLIRE),76 a 
research, training, and advocacy programme, is to promote religious freedom on the 
continent, following CCPR General Comment No. 22 of Article 18 of the UDHR and Article 
 
75  See the Arab Barometer website.   





12 of the American Convention on Human Rights.77 Religious freedom is seen as a broad 
and multidimensional concept that needs to be protected in all spheres of society. 
Religious freedom is much more than freedom of worship: it involves the freedom to live 
and express one’s religion individually and collectively in the family sphere, the school 
sphere, the business sphere, and the cultural sphere. Restrictions on religious expression 
in any sphere of society, whether caused by state or non-state actors, are restrictions on 
religious freedom. Latin American societies have made much progress in recent years, 
but challenges remain, particularly related to the enforcement of religious freedom in 
some areas. Principles include the view that religious persons and organisations are 
entitled to participate actively in public debate without any restriction, like any other civil 
society organisation, as long as they do not seek to impose their views on the rest of 
society. State institutions must not be subordinated to religious institutions. 
 
OLIRE’s activities include: 
 
• Monitoring: OLIRE monitors the state of religious freedom in the region by 
documenting incidents of violation of religious freedom, and investigating the 
structural conditions that threaten it. 
• Empowering: Through training individuals or organisations, especially religious 
minorities, OLIRE promotes a greater understanding of the right to religious 
freedom and awareness of how to defend it. 
• Influencing: OLIRE carries out advocacy efforts by developing public policy 
recommendations for the effective protection of religious freedom, especially of 
religious minorities in different areas and at all levels. It uses resources such as 
presentations to public and private entities, podcasts, interviews, as well as other 




The eMORE Project (the Peace Institute) has supported the development and 
improvement of efficient monitoring and reporting mechanisms for online hate speech 
and hate crimes, seeking to integrate monitoring and reporting tools into ‘a joint 
innovative knowledge model’.78 The two-year, EU-funded project was transnational, with 
 
77  See CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion) and the American 
Convention on Human Rights. 






a broad definition of hate crime that includes gender hostility and hate offences 
motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, and disability. 
 
eMORE consists of a crawler for monitoring online hate speech and an app for reporting 
offline and online hate crime and speech in Europe. The app demonstrates how new 
technologies are employed to understand and share data. eMORE has worked with nine 
project partners, who collect data independently and create individual project reports on 
their own country, to create a common database crawler and multi-level report tool app. 
Cases are reported by citizens who have experienced or witnessed incidents of hate 
speech, and by citizens and organisations actively working in the field. Findings from the 
crawler and app, quantitative and qualitative results, are analysed by country. eMORE 
acknowledges that country differences require the application of percentages to initial 
data for consistency and cross-country comparisons and that limited accessibility to the 
internet in some countries may influence results. As online media is evolving constantly, 
the technologies involved are adjusted frequently. Research guidelines are still being 
developed, and methods must be flexible. Initial results are influenced by the background 
and expertise of eMORE partners as well as the varying availability and quality/reliability 
of data per country. The project appears to offer a high level of transparency and 
adaptability. 
 
2.4.6 The Observatory on Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism (REACT Observatory) 
 
The REACT Observatory is a joint initiative between a Swiss company START InSight 
(Lugano), Centro di ricerca ITSTIME (Università Cattolica in Milan), Link Campus 
University (Rome), Centro di Ricerca CEMAS (Università La Sapienza, Rome), and SIOI 
(Rome). 79 It combines research, analysis, editorial production, training, communication, 
consulting services, and network-building. The aim is to facilitate ‘a proficient exchange 
of skills, knowledge and understanding of geopolitical and security issues and to build a 
sound international cooperation network’. The focus is on the Mediterranean, the Arab 
and Islamic worlds, on conflicts, radicalisation and terrorism contexts, security (micro and 
macro levels), and European defence policies. It interacts with researchers, experts, the 
media, legislators, private companies and the general public, with a view to discussing 
and offering useful perspectives which can be modelled on different clients’ interests and 
necessities, be it public, private, or academic institutions and companies. The project is 
headquartered in Lugano (Switzerland) and operates in Turin and Rome. 
 
 





2.4.7 Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM) Hate and Violence 
Speech Observatory  
 
The Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM) responds to the sharp rise 
in the use of hate speech, incitement to violence and terrorism, and sectarian incitement 
and discrimination against women and marginalised groups in Syrian media since 2011. 
The study began in 2017 and has collected primary data using quota sampling over the 
course of one week, 24–30 May 2018, by monitoring the media to determine which types 
use the most hate speech and incitements to violence, separated by press, audio or visual 
and political orientation (pro-regime, pro-opposition, and Kurdish). The study uses a 
Descriptive Analytical Method, which incorporates both qualitative descriptions and 
quantitative scales of phenomena studied. Unlike other studies and observatories that 
monitor incidents as they happen, this study was limited to secondary data collected in 
past studies and one week of real-time monitoring.  
 
The study encountered several difficulties in monitoring media, including disparities in 
rates of publishing and politically oriented media, highlighting challenges with monitoring 
approaches in countries whose regimes may censor, manipulate, or contribute to bias in 
the media. It relied on the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) for its content. The study 
reflects the recent emphasis on early warning systems to recognise incitements to 
violence, and the significance of media in proliferating hate speech. 
 
2.5 Citizen reporting and reporting platforms 
Many monitoring tools overlap or are accompanied by self-reporting platforms. These 
methods complement one another, with both relying heavily on local groups and 
individual voices rather than larger surveys or reports relying on international and 
government institutions. Self-reported data or data obtained through interviews may be 
limited by distrust or confidentiality concerns. 
 
2.5.1 The CIVICUS Monitor  
 
This interactive online portal80 tracks civil society conditions in 196 countries, integrating 
information from civil society organisations and activists to create country ratings as they 
are assessed over time. Unlike many other tools or ranking systems, CIVICUS gives local 
groups a platform and voice, often missing from international indices and reports. It is 
sensitive to rapid changes occurring in civil society by incorporating input from users of 
the site in the analysis. It combines qualitative and quantitative data, using ‘updated 
ratings from civil society organisations and reports from national, regional, and 
 





international civil society organisations. These external analyses are then paired with 
CIVICUS’ own analysis to arrive at country ratings for all assessed countries and 
territories.’ To verify the strength of data sources and analysis, an independent panel of 
experts evaluates country ratings. Actions that violate religious rights are a frequent topic 
in reports but there is no systematic approach to this aspect. 
 
2.6 Monitoring specific to a country or community 
 
Review programmes, methodologies, and pertinent reports often focus on specific 
countries (Iraq, Russia), regions (Southeast Asia, the Sahel), religious communities 
(Muslims, Baha’is), or especially vulnerable groups (Yazidis, Nigeria’s Middle Belt 
Christians, Shia Muslims in the Gulf). The approaches aim to provide in-depth analysis of 
specific situations, reflected in reports. Two recent examples are the 2019 commission 
headed by the Bishop of Truro (Mountstephen 2019) for the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) on Persecuted Christians, and analysis by Daniel Philpott 
(2019) of religious freedom in the world’s Muslim majority countries. These illustrate the 
need, beyond broad indices and comparative assessments, to delve into the details of 
each situation, with robust and contextualised approaches and, invariably, efforts to 
compensate in various ways for patchy and often missing data. A few illustrative 
examples are highlighted below. 
 
2.6.1 Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI)  
 
The Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI), an NGO in Georgia, was established with 
multiple purposes: to ‘foster religious freedom and tolerance in Georgia; facilitate civic 
engagement; promote multiculturalism, secular principles and the idea of espousing 
state neutrality in the field of religion; enhance networking and policy dialogue between 
religious minority communities and the government; strengthen capacities of religious 
minority organizations in the field of advocacy and counteraction to discrimination; 
research and monitor state policy on the protection of minority rights.’81 TDI states that it 
does not have thorough methodology for identifying hate crimes or a way to record them. 
However, TDI’s database on such cases is linked to its legal aid work, for which TDI’s data 
collection methods were designed.  
 
Trust is an important and proactive element of TDI’s work with different organisations, 
making it possible to obtain relevant information. Religious leaders and organisations are 
the channel for most reports on abuses, and TDI also follows up on cases reported in the 
media. TDI has worked closely with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, drawing on their system of 
 





recording and reporting hate crimes. TDI receives information about hate crimes from JW 
about the investigation process, and TDI assists with advocacy. However, when it comes 
to other crimes against other religious organisations – for example, against Muslims in 
2012 and 2016 – the cases were publicised in the media. TDI also works with Muslim 
religious leaders.  
 
TDI periodically requests information from the Ministry of Interior or the Prosecutor’s 
Office, to follow up on relevant cases, check progress, and give recommendations on 
follow-up. This aspect of its work (securing information through official channels) is 
challenging, and information often arrives late or is too generic to be much help. TDI 
requests state statistics on hate crime on an annual basis, whether racial, ethnic, or 
religious. The information is presented in ways that do not allow TDI to distinguish 
between the different kinds of hate crimes. There are gaps in data and questions as to its 
validity: active investigations are recorded rather than reported crimes. The government 
lacks a hate crime recording database, though efforts are under way to establish one, 
with support from international partners, including the Council of Europe.  
 
A special unit within the Ministry of Interior, the human rights department, is in charge of 
monitoring hate crimes. While TDI can identify issues and communicate about individual 
cases, the unit lacks a systemic approach that would enable the NGO to gain a better 
picture of the situation more broadly. 
 
2.6.2 Religious Freedom Monitoring Network Project  
 
The Religious Freedom Monitoring Network Project utilises an entirely Russian 
independent monitoring network to cultivate interreligious dialogue and monitor the 
observance of the rights of believers in Russia. Monitoring the scale of persecution is 
difficult, as it is often hidden by state authorities, and information is obtained from 
internal networks: ‘Church leaders, out of fear of spoiling relations with the authorities, 
publish only the most egregious cases of unlawful pressure, trying to resolve less 
dramatic situations through behind-the-scenes arrangements. Independent networks 
make it possible to give an objective impression of the true situation in the country in the 
field of religious freedom. A feature of the network is its reliance on basic congregations 
and pastors with whom direct contacts are built. They are thus able to provide the 
collection and processing of information not from online media or local media, but 
through direct interviews and field studies. By working with local congregations, the hope 
is to identify human rights and religious freedom violations that did not make headlines 





study are still unclear, and therefore the empirical successes or limitations of this 
approach are difficult to assess as yet.82 
 
2.6.3 Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) 
 
The Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM), a project of the Muslim Council of Britain 
launched in July 2019, publishes quarterly reports on the state of media reporting on 
Islam and Muslims. It aims to improve the quality of reporting by engaging constructively. 
CfMM monitors all main British media outlets, including 31 online platforms and five 
broadcasters. Its monitoring focuses on 50 chosen words relating to Islam and Muslims 
(in their various spelling and plurals). The data thus obtained are further analysed against 
five metrics: ‘association with negative aspects or behaviour, misrepresentation, 
generalisations, lack of due prominence to a Muslim voice or identity, issues with imagery 
or headlines’ (Hanif 2019: 4). CfMM rates each item for bias. CfMM acknowledges that 
‘there are limitations as well as elements of subjectivity. However, with the guidance of 
experts, the process has been designed to be as objective, and exhaustive, as is 
reasonably possible’ (ibid.). As an example of CfMM’s work, its report covering the period 
October to December 2018 analysed 10,931 articles: findings revealed that 59 per cent of 
all articles analysed associated Muslims with negative behaviours, with over a third of all 
articles generalising or misrepresenting Muslims (ibid.: 5). 
 
2.6.4 The Community Security Trust (CST) 
 
The Community Security Trust (CST), a charity representing the Jewish community in the 
UK on matters of anti-Semitism, policing, and security, publishes annual reports on its 
findings of anti-Semitic incidents. CST indicates that such incidents are reported by 
victims, witnesses, or by someone acting on their behalf, and in various ways; for 
example, by telephone, email, post, using the CST website or social media platforms, or in 
person (CST 2020: 11). CST clarifies that after an incident is reported to CST, if there is no 
evidence of anti-Semitic motivation, language or targeting, CST would not record it as 
antisemitic. CST recognises six categories of anti-Semitic incidents: extreme violence, 
assault, damage and desecration of property, threats, abusive behaviour, and anti-
Semitic literature (ibid.: 15). 
 
In 2019, CST recorded 1,805 anti-Semitic incidents in the UK, 7 per cent higher than in 
2018 (ibid.: 4). Among them, CST recorded 157 incidents as assaults, with an increase of 
27% from 2018. CST’s recording system allows them to break down numbers by 
category, but also into more specific details, such as the type of assault, for example: In 
44 of the 157 anti-Semitic assaults recorded in 2019, the perpetrators punched or kicked 
 





their victims. There were 19 occurrences of an object being thrown at a Jewish person 
from a vehicle, and 17 instances involving eggs being thrown. Ten incidents involved 
spitting and a miscellaneous weapon was employed six times. The physical attack was 
accompanied by an element of verbal abuse in 85 instances, and by threatening 
language in 13 (ibid.: 16). 
 
CST drew on Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain. A Study of Attitudes towards 
Jews and Israel, which was based on a 2016/17 survey of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel 
attitudes (Staetsky 2017: 67). The survey was developed by the Institute for Jewish Policy 
Research, in cooperation with CST, the Antisemitism Policy Trust, and Ipsos MORI. 
Fieldwork was carried out by Ipsos MORI, with data analysis by the Institute for Jewish 
Policy Research. Some 2,003 individuals were interviewed face to face and 2,002 online 
(out of a voluntary panel of approximately 220,000 members who agreed to take part in 
market research) (ibid.).  
 
2.6.5 Tell MAMA  
 
Tell MAMA is an independent, UK-based NGO working to tackle anti-Muslim hatred. Its 
work ‘is not influenced or wholly shaped by Government’, though it works with the central 
government to raise the issues of anti-Muslim hatred at a policy level. The aim is to shape 
and inform policymakers, whilst ensuring that insights are brought to the topic through 
the systematic recording and reporting of anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes. 
Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) is ‘a secure and reliable service that allows 
people from across England to report any form of Anti-Muslim abuse’. The organisation 
comments: ‘We have created a unique portal where you may address your concerns and 
record any incident that you experience as a result of your Muslim faith or someone 
perceiving you to be Muslim. By using our “Submit a Report” section, you can describe the 
details of the abuse you suffered, whether verbal or physical, and then add in the location 
of the attack so that we can effectively map incidents across England. We can also refer 
you for support through partner agencies if you have been a victim of an Anti-Muslim 
incident.’83  
 
The approach relies on incident reports of abuse submitted through a website or various 
social media platforms. Caseworkers verify all information with the person who submitted 
the report. Researchers then analyse trends and content. The programme aims to 
support victims, the primary source of incident reports. However, working with police 
forces to provide support may deter some individuals who distrust police from reporting 
or seeking support from Tell MAMA. The primary methodological challenge associated 
 





with this self-reporting is accounting for gaps. Incidents may go unreported for fear of 
speaking out, lack of awareness of services, or mistrust of public services or police forces. 
The availability of some information also depends on what is disclosed and whether 
victims have consented to the information being included in reports. Along with trust 
concerns, reporting may be limited by a lack of awareness of the programme, particularly 
in target communities. In 2018, 1,282 reports were submitted to Tell MAMA, 1,072 of 
which were verified, and 1,891 anti-Muslim incidents were reported by UK police forces. 
Growing awareness of Tell MAMA in Muslim communities, and among key stakeholders 
and partners, has resulted in a greater willingness amongst victims and witnesses to 
report.  
 
2.7 Methodologies focused on long-term trends 
 
2.7.1 USHMM Early Warning Project’s Annual Statistical Risk Assessment84 
 
Substantial efforts have gone to developing the Early Warning Project, a joint initiative of 
the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum and the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth 
College. Launched in 2015, the project’s core goal is to contribute to the prevention of 
genocide and mass atrocities. The first public early warning system for mass atrocities, it 
aims to provide governments, civil society groups, and other influential actors with early 
and reliable warnings of mass atrocities and thus greater opportunities to take preventive 
action. Specific goals are to improve the quality and depth of discussions about risks of 
genocide and mass atrocities and the ongoing need for prevention policies, both in 
particular countries and globally, and to advance the science of early warning for mass 
atrocities. 
 
The Early Warning Project looks to early signs of mass killing, defined as over 1,000 non-
combatant fatalities, targeted as part of a specific group, over a period of one year or 
less. Parameters around what constitutes a combatant are needed (e.g. gang members, 
violent protesters = combatants, peaceful protests = non-combatants) and against which 
specific group).85 Data sources are updated annually and go back to 1945 for state-led 
mass killings or to 1989 for non-state led, covering all countries. It uses 34 variables from 
11 data sources to generate their statistical risk assessment. One variable is a 0-4 ranking 
for religious freedom from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). There is also a variable for 
social group equity from V-DEM. 
 
84  See USHMM Early Warning Project’s Annual Statistical Risk Assessment.  






The central research question is to identify which countries today resemble countries that 
have experienced mass killing. The aim is thus to train different statistical algorithms on 
historical data (1945–2015) to identify a model that performs well in predicting onset of 
mass killing. Using current data on countries, it makes forecasts two years into the future 
(2016 data is used for the 2017–18 forecasts; 2017 data for the 2018–19 forecasts); this 
generates an estimated risk (as a percentage chance of onset of mass killing, usually 
relatively low) for each country, and a corresponding ranking. As of the 2017–18 
assessment, the ‘winning’ algorithm is a logistic regression model with ‘elastic-net’ 
regularisation. Results indicate that eight out of every ten countries that later experienced 
a new onset of mass killing had risk estimates of greater than four per cent (they were 
usually among the 30 top-ranked countries in a given year). The ranking produced by the 
statistical model distinguishes between different levels of risk, relying in part on the 
wisdom of crowd-forecasting where anyone can provide a forecast. Paired comparison 
surveys are sometimes used (which of these two is more likely to see a new episode of 
mass killing).  
 
Analysis is conducted based on four broad categories: (1) Highest Risk, (2) Unexpected 
Results, (3) Increasing Risk, and (4) Consistently High Risk. Country reports follow the 
Department of State/USAID framework, with scenario mapping, looking to countries that 
are high risk but not getting sufficient attention, and where it is feasible to conduct 
research and garner attention from policymakers (i.e. people will read it). Users include 
the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,86 and US 
Government policymakers, the International Peace Institute, USIP, etc. The aim is to have 
more international use.  
  
In 2017, the project revised its Statistical Risk Assessment strategy to include non-state-
perpetrated mass killing, to extend the forecasting window to two years, and to include 
new data sets that had become publicly available. Perhaps most significantly, it tested 
several statistical algorithms and selected an approach that maximised forecasting 
accuracy and interpretability. Previously, the project used an average of forecasts from 
three models representing different ideas about the origins of mass atrocities: the ‘Bad 
regime’ model, based on work by Barbara Harff and the Political Instability Task Force; 
the ‘Elite threat’ model, using statistical forecasts of future coup attempts and new civil 
wars as proxy measures of factors that could provoke mass killings; and a machine-
learning process called Random Forests, applied to the risk factors identified by the other 
two models.  
 
 





Prompted by the Genocide Prevention Task Force (2008) report, the initial project idea 
was developed by Professor Benjamin Valentino during a 2011 fellowship at the Simon-
Skjodt Center, and moved to implementation, assisted by Dr Jay Ulfelder (a noted expert 
in statistical forecasting methods). It originally used the Random Forests model of 
machine learning, and now uses the logit model.87 The methodology is comprehensive 
and covers all countries, seeking to remove some human biases by using a machine 
learning model. In November 2019, the 2019–20 report was released, based on 2018 
data.88 The statistical risk assessment does not, however, delve into who the perpetrators 
are or their possible motivations, just the probability of occurrence. The country reports 
and crowd-forecasting wisdom supplement the analysis. 
 
2.8 Broad-based methodologies on social cohesion and development with 
varying treatment of religious minorities and/or FoRB 
 
In international development institutions, as well as academic circles, an increasing array 
of indices are used, both to secure insights and to set specific parameters for, for 
example, allocations of concessional aid and eligibility for certain categories of 
assistance and procurement. Private investors often look to these indices as they make 
investment decisions. Widely used measures include the Human Development Index 
produced by UNDP, various measures of governance, including the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index, the Mo Ibrahim Index for Africa, and the 
World Bank’s CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) and its equivalent for 
regional and other development banks. Freedom House indicators are widely cited, as 
are measures produced by the World Economic Forum, including the Global Gender Gap 
Index89 and measures of competitiveness. On governance alone, Robert Rotberg (2015) 
outlines 93 indices developed as comparative measures. Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) are regularly conducted at national level with results widely used in policy 
and project planning. Newer measures of wellbeing and happiness also form part of 
strategic reviews, policy analysis, setting targets and objectives, and assessment of 
performance. The Social Progress Imperative is designed specifically with a functional, 
operational use in mind. The data that underpin the specific targets and performance 
measures for the SDGs link in many cases to these and other reports that rely on various 
methodologies (e.g. reports on children, refugees, and hunger). 
 
 
87  See methodology section on the Early Warning Project website.   
88  The report can be downloaded from the Early Warning Project website. 





An important question is how far, in these measures and indices, religious topics – 
including religious inequality and violations of religious freedom – are taken into account. 
The answer is: very rarely. If they are, the indicators used tend to be minimal and often 
questionable as overall measures of religious contributions to the topic at hand.90 Thus an 
important topic is how religious indicators might be better integrated.  
 
Several methodologies that fall into this broad category are summarised briefly below, as 
indicative examples of their approach and the ways in which some do, or do not, take 
religious dimensions into account. 
 
2.8.1 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
 
The Human Rights Watch (HRW) annual review of human rights practices around the 
world focuses on thematic concerns in over 90 countries and territories. It draws on 
events over the course of the previous year to highlight critical human rights concerns 
and formulate recommendations to key actors and political agencies to combat human 
rights violations. HRW does not focus on religious freedom or belief, although these 
violations are invariably connected to broader human rights concerns. For many of the 
examples provided, distinguishing between human rights abuses and violations of 
religious freedom is difficult, with lines between them often blurred.  
 
HRW’s researchers collect from a variety of sources, although field-based research is at 
its centre, with some researchers based permanently in the field. Field research relies on 
interviews, especially with victims and witnesses of abuses, field and media 
investigations, and collaboration and communication with local activists, civil society 
organisations, lawyers, journalists, and government officials, again emphasising the need 
for on-the-ground relationships. Reports are not all encompassing, nor is the selection of 
issues intended to reflect a priority ordering by importance. Human Rights Watch has 
insufficient capacity to address the wide range of global human rights issues in a 
comprehensive way. As the methodology is not clearly laid out in the annual report, the 
criteria for what is and is not included is generally unclear.  
 
 
90  To take an example, in the US Millennium Challenge Corporation report on methodologies for assessing countries 
for eligibility for access to funding in 2020, there is one mention of ‘religious’ (none of religion or faith): ‘1. Political 
Rights: Independent experts rate countries on the prevalence of free and fair electoral processes; political pluralism 
and participation of all stakeholders; government accountability and transparency; freedom from domination by 
the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies and economic oligarchies; and the political 
rights of minority groups, among other things. Pass: Score must be above the minimum score of 17 out of 40. 






The HRW website has readily accessible information detailing their research process, and 
emphasises certain challenges, including conducting research in regions they define as 
‘closed-societies’.91 Like other field research, obtaining information in these regions, 
without threatening the safety of the researchers or collaborators, can be a challenge. 
Unlike the US Department of State, Human Rights Watch reports overcome this challenge 
through long-distance or online communications, border interviews, and through using 
satellite technology. NGOs or independent research bodies may be less biased, less prone 
to politicising conflicts, and viewed as less threatening to potential communiques, 
presenting a potential advantage in field research. However, as is explicit in its reports 
and websites, HRW does prescribe an ideology which it uses as the basis for identifying 
conflicts of interests and focus areas: ‘[W]e choose our countries of focus, and the issues 
we address, based on where we think our attention is needed, and where we can make a 
difference’. This goal-oriented reporting differs from reports seeking to establish unbiased 
accounts of positive and negative developments in religious freedoms or human rights. 
 
2.8.2 International Crisis Group 
 
The International Crisis Group (ICG) relies heavily on field research and in-country 
relationships, with its research focusing on global conflicts (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2014). ICG aims to engage with ‘all parties, speak to local, regional and international 
actors, and forge a common language for resolving disputes’ (ibid.). Analysts are based in 
or near conflict zones and vulnerable countries, cultivating strong networks of contacts 
over years of sustained work. ICG rarely focuses explicitly or directly on religious minorities 
or on FoRB. 
 
2.8.3 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 
 
The Variety of Democracy (V-Dem) Project – based at Gothenburg University – provides a 
multidimensional and disaggregated data set that reflects the complexity of the concept 
of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections.92 It 
distinguishes between five high-level principles of democracy – electoral, liberal, 
participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian – and collects data to measure these 
principles. The most recent version (V10) covers 202 countries from 1900 to 2019. The 
indicator of religious freedom is a single measure that captures the extent to which 
individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and 
practice that religion in private or in public, as well as to proselytise peacefully without 
being subject to restrictions by public authorities. This methodology illustrates 
 
91  See the Human Rights Watch website. 





approaches and databases where religious dimensions are included but in a peripheral 
manner. 
 
2.8.4 Freedom House 
 
Since 1972, ‘Freedom in the World’ has been produced each year by a team of in-house 
and external analysts and expert advisers from the academic, think tank, and human 
rights communities. The 2019 edition involved more than 100 analysts and over 30 
advisers. Analysts who prepare the draft reports and scores use a broad range of sources, 
including news articles, academic analyses, reports from NGOs, individual professional 
contacts, and on-the-ground research. They score countries and territories based on the 
conditions and events within their borders during the coverage period. The analysts’ 
proposed scores are discussed and defended at a series of review meetings, organised by 
region and attended by Freedom House staff and a panel of expert advisers. The final 
scores represent the consensus of the analysts, advisers, and staff.93 
 
Although an element of subjectivity is unavoidable in such an enterprise, the ratings 
process emphasises methodological consistency, intellectual rigour, and balanced and 
unbiased judgements.  
 
Freedom House does not believe that legal guarantees of rights are sufficient for 
on-the-ground fulfillment of those rights. While both laws and actual practices are 
factored into scoring decisions, greater emphasis is placed on implementation. 
Freedom in the World operates from the assumption that freedom for all people is 
best achieved in liberal democratic societies.94  
 
Analysts are provided with a series of characteristics to use when scoring countries, along 
with questions and sub-questions to provide additional guidance in data collection and 
scoring.  
 
2.8.5 The Anti-Defamation League  
 
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) H.E.A.T. map is interactive and customisable, 
visualising extremist and anti-Semitic incidents across the US.95 Data were collected from 
news and media reports, government documents, including police reports, victim reports, 
 
93  See Freedom in the World Research Methodology.  
 
94  Ibid. 





extremist sources, Center on Extremism investigations, and others. The Hate Crime Map, 
another ADL tool, collects legislative data on the presence of hate crime laws across five 
variables: race/religion/ethnicity; sexual orientation; disability; gender; and gender 
identity. It maps hate crimes from 2004 to 2017 using data from the FBI. 
 
Reliance on the FBI for data may limit data collection.  
 
Studies show that knowing the nature and magnitude of the hate crime problem is 
fundamental for resource allocation and crime deterrence. More important, 
targeted communities are much more likely to report crime and cooperate in 
investigations if they believe law enforcement authorities are ready and able to 
respond to hate violence.96 
 
The degree and scale of hate crime is not evaluated (no qualitative data or evaluation is 
provided). Under-reporting is acknowledged. The report is limited to the US. 
 
2.8.6 The CIVICUS Monitor 
 
The CIVICUS Monitor also uses interactive maps to visualise rankings, with colours 
indicating the level of repression or risk.97 CIVICUS covers a large number of countries and 
allows the user to select a country and read more about its rating and related media 
and/or internal publications. Maps are an effective way of visualising and interacting with 
data, but fall into traps that resemble other ranking systems as causes behind inter-
country comparisons can be difficult to discern. 
  
 
96  ADL Hate Crime Map. 
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Annexe 1: Mapping Types of FoRB 
Violations98 
 
Type of violation Examples of relevant questions to ask 
 
Violations of the right to have, 
adopt, change, or leave a religion or 
belief  
 
Are there attempts to extinguish or eliminate particular 
religious or belief groups and identities?  
Are particular beliefs and religions prohibited (including 
atheism)? Are there social hostilities connected to 
having a particular belief or religion?  
Is conversion and apostasy prohibited or restricted? Are 
there social hostilities connected to changing or leaving 
a particular religion or belief?  
Are people required to reveal/register their religion, e.g. 
on ID cards?  
Is interreligious marriage permitted or is one spouse 
required to convert?  
Violations of the right to be free 
from coercion  
Do individuals face coercion to practice or refrain from 
practising religion, or to follow religiously motivated 
codes of conduct? 
 
Violations of the right to practise 
and manifest a religion or belief  
Do religious or belief groups have to register through 
discriminatory or cumbersome registration procedures? 
Is unregistered religious or belief activity illegal or 
restricted?  
Are religious or belief groups or individuals banned 
from, restricted in, or prevented from worshipping and 
assembling, and from establishing and maintaining 
organisations and places for these purposes?  
Are religious or belief groups or individuals banned 
from, restricted in or prevented from teaching, 
communicating about and disseminating opinions, 
information, and knowledge about their religion or 
belief?  
 





Is proselytisation prohibited or restricted? Is 
proselytisation met with societal hostility? Are foreign 
missionaries banned from or restricted in operating?  
Is blasphemy and/or criticism of religion prohibited or 
connected with social hostilities?  
Is the use of particular religious clothing or symbols 
obligatory, prohibited or restricted? Is lack of adherence 
met with societal hostility? 
Violations of the right to non-
discrimination on the basis of 
religion or belief  
Are particular religious or belief groups or identities 
favoured in such a manner that other groups or 
identities are disadvantaged?  
Are there incidents of religiously based hate speech and 
incitement to hatred?  
Is family law discriminatory on the basis of religion or 
belief?  
Is there religiously based discrimination against 
particular groups or individuals in the education system, 
whether in terms of access, contents of education or 
otherwise?  
Is there social and/or economic discrimination on the 
basis of religion or belief?  
Violations of the right to bring up 
one’s children in accordance with 
one’s religion or belief  
Are children banned from or restricted in participating in 
religious activities?  
Is school teaching on religion or belief confessional? Are 
exemptions to confessional religious education, or 
aspects of education that raise religious or other 
conscientious sensibilities, made available, both in 
principle and in practice, to all children/parents who 
object to participation?  
If one party to a marriage converts are children 
automatically re-registered (converted) by the state 
without the permission of the other spouse? Can 







Annexe 2: France and Limits on Religious 
Freedom: Cults 
 
France stands out for restrictions on freedom to practise religion that involve explicit 
efforts to define and list prohibited entities, alongside administrative mechanisms and 
active public debate.99  
In July 1995, the French National Assembly set up a Parliamentary Commission on Cults 
in France (Commission parlementaire sur les sectes en France), following events involving 
the members of the Order of the Solar Temple in late 1994, with a murder-suicide incident 
in the Vercors Mountains. It categorised various groups according to their supposed 
threat or innocuity (towards members of the groups themselves or towards society and 
the state). The Commission reported back in December 1995.100 Legislation followed that 
aimed to define and limit what were considered dangerous religious sects, or cults. Other 
French Parliamentary Commissions on cults reported in 1999 (focused on tax and 
finance aspects) and in 2006 (focused on impact on children). At one point, 172 groups 
were blacklisted, ranging from Eastern to Christian in orientation, including Baptists.  
The controversial 2001 About-Picard Law allowed the government to ban religious 
groups if they were found to be manipulative and abusive, making brainwashing an 
explicit issue. The law was Europe’s toughest anti-sect legislation yet, creating a 
controversial new crime of ‘mental manipulation’. Organisations that have been listed are 
the Church of Scientology, the Unification Church, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
A 2005 circulaire stressed ongoing vigilance concerning cults, but France’s Prime Minister 
suggested that due to changes in cult behaviour and organisation, the list of specific cults 
had become less pertinent. Civil servants were to avoid depending on generic lists of cult 
groups but instead to apply criteria set in consultation with Miviludes.101 
The government has a cult-tracking agency that tracks sectarian activity (e.g. it reports 
an increase from 954 incidents in the first half of 2015 to 1,266 in the first half of 
2016). An inter-ministerial organisation, the Mission interministérielle de lutte contre les 
sectes (MILS), was later replaced by the Miviludes. It has been less visible and active since 
2014, when it assessed the sectarian risk posed by Femen, a radical feminist group 
whose mission is ‘complete victory over patriarchy’. Miviludes tentatively tried to tackle 
 
99  See Nugent and Colin (2017). 
100  See Parliamentary Commission on Cults in France Wikipedia webpage. 
101  Mission interministrielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les derives sectaires [the Interministerial Mission for 





radical Islam following the outbreak of terrorist attacks in 2014, but the Minister of the 
Interior has taken that responsibility. GAT (Groupe Appui Technique, or Technical Support 
Group), a government task force created in 2009 and charged with informing health 
professionals of dangerous holistic health trends, disbanded in 2015.  
 
A different but important measure is the 14 September 2010 act of parliament which 
banned the wearing of face-covering headgear, including masks, helmets, balaclavas, 
niqabs, and other veils covering the face in public places, except under special 






Annexe 3: US Foreign Policy and Religious 
Freedom 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, cases of religious persecution in different world regions 
generated public debate that resulted in 1998 legislation that set out a distinct set of 
policies and institutions reflecting a national commitment to global religious freedom. The 
legislation and institutions drew on traditions of religious freedom as a foundational value 
for the US, extending them to a broad understanding of their application in foreign policy. 
The 1941 ‘four freedoms’, set out by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, provided a moral 
and political grounding, as did the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
 
The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) was preceded by efforts to enact 
a religious persecution act, focused on persecution of Christians, using its own definitions 
of human rights, religious freedom, and religious persecution issues and focused on 
certain countries that included, prominently, Sudan and China. IRFA was eventually 
crafted, embodying international definitions related to the purposes of IRFA, addressing 
all religious groups equally, and applying to US relations with all nations.  
Passed with bipartisan support from Democrats and Republicans and signed by 
President Bill Clinton, IRFA promoted religious freedom as an important US foreign policy 
concern, and mandated efforts to improve the status of religious freedom in countries 
that engage in or tolerate violations of religious freedom. IRFA required the US to 
advocate on the behalf of individuals persecuted for their religious beliefs and activities in 
foreign countries. 
 
IRFA defined three entities to monitor persecution and to promote action:  
 
1. An Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom within the 
Department of State. The provision aimed to put in place a comprehensive 
structure headed by a high-ranking diplomat who could negotiate with other 
governments on behalf of the President, would oversee the programmatic funding 
of the State Department on religious freedom issues, and oversee the Annual 
Report on International Religious Freedom,102 which requires US embassies 
around the world to interact with their counterparts and NGOs in the process of 
reporting, as well as requiring the US to state what efforts it has undertaken to 
promote religious freedom. He/she is a principal adviser to the President and 
 





Secretary of State, and the highest-ranking US diplomat on international religious 
freedom issues. 
2. The Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent, nine-
member bipartisan US government agency to monitor the status of freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, and give independent policy 
recommendations to improve US policy on religious freedom to the President, the 
Secretary of State, and the Congress. The Commission is funded entirely by the 
federal government on an annual basis and staffed by government employees. It 
monitors the effect of other countries’ policies on religious groups, and may hold 
hearings to educate Congress and the public about religious persecution in 
different countries. The Commission has advisory and monitoring authority 
(including authority to hold hearings); it cannot implement sanctions on countries 
that violate religious freedom. The Department of State reports include a detailed 
country-by-country analysis of religious freedom, but the Commission’s report 
covers few countries, with policy recommendations to the executive and 
legislative branches of the government. The Commission report also reviews and 
analyses the State Department’s work on the topic.  
3. The President is assigned a special adviser on international religious freedom 
within the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as a resource for executive 
branch officials. Since IRFA’s passage, this had never been a freestanding position 
at the NSC until 2020; previously an official with other responsibilities had been 
assigned this designation.  
 
When the bill was being debated (followed also by scholars and human rights 
advocates), there was much discussion as to the advisability of taking religious freedom 
out of the broader human rights office and maintaining a separate office, led by an 
official of basically the same rank as the head of the Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor (DRL) division (the formal name for the Department of State’s human rights office). 
Some argued that this would distort the balance of human rights, lifting religious freedom 
to a status above that of other core human rights. The argument that prevailed was that 
religious freedom was too often overlooked by governments in their human rights efforts, 
as well as by human rights organisations and human rights regional courts. Creating this 
separate structure would be an ‘affirmative action’ programme, needed to lift religious 
freedom up to the level of other human rights in US foreign policy.  
 
The Annual Report has had a large impact on religious freedom literacy and activities 
among Department of State officials. First, every year in every embassy and in a number 
of consulates, foreign service officers are assigned to prepare the report. Their drafts are 





regional desk level. Over the 20 years of reports, thousands of foreign service staff have 
engaged with these issues and some now serve at assistant secretary, ambassadorial, 
and DCM (deputy chief of mission) levels. Second, the engagement with religious groups 
on the ground who suffer discrimination and persecution provides avenues of assistance 
to which these groups can turn when problems increase. US inquiries and interventions 
with relevant host country government officials often have a positive impact. And finally, 
religious leaders of oppressed, often small and politically isolated, religious communities 
tell US officials that it encourages them to have their story lifted up in the reports before 
the world. The US hears from other governments that the reports are helpful as a 
blueprint for their own embassy human rights officers.  
 
Another cornerstone of IRFA is the requirement that each year the President reviews and 
determines whether any country has met the threshold, based on international human 
rights law, of Country of Particular Concern (CPC), engaging in or tolerating ‘particularly 
severe violations of religious freedom’. The CPC determinations lead to a consultation 
and negotiations process, resulting in a range of actions and sanctions if the offences are 
not addressed. Based on similar successful provisions in trade law, IRFA provided that the 
goal of these negotiations was to secure a ‘Binding Agreement’ to cease the violations. 
Any designation then leads to a series of negotiations and consultations, resulting in a 
number of possible actions available to the President, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, the Ambassador at Large, the National Security Council special adviser, and the 
Commission, as a response to those countries. In practice, this authority of the President 
is delegated to the Secretary of State and the Ambassador. Countries that are severe 
violators of religious freedom are categorised as CPCs and this subjects them to punitive 
sanctions, listed in Sec. 405. The President must either enter into a binding agreement 
with the concerned country to end the religious persecution, or choose from remedies 
outlined in the Act which offer the President 15 options to exercise against countries 
engaging in religious persecution, ranging from private negotiations to sanctions, or a 
‘commensurate action’ not listed in IRFA, but which would serve the purpose of 
advancing religious freedom. These include: 
 
• A private or a public demarche; 
• A private or public condemnation; 
• The delay or cancellation of scientific or cultural exchanges; 
• The denial, delay, or cancellation of working, official or state visits;  
• The withdrawing, limitation, or suspension of some forms of US aid; 
• Direction to public and private international institutions to deny assistance; and 
• Sanctions prohibiting the US government from entering into import or export 





The President may waive punitive measures against the concerned country if he or she 
determines that national security is at risk or if the proposed action would harm rather 
than benefit the individuals and communities IRFA is designed to help. 
 
The only Binding Agreement under IRFA to date followed the designation of Vietnam as a 
CPC. Vietnam issued a decree ordering the cessation of its practice of forced 
renunciations of faith, released all known religious prisoners, and allowed hundreds of 
churches it had shut down to reopen.  
 
IRFA seeks to promote religious freedom abroad through international media, exchanges, 
and foreign service awards for working to promote human rights. It requires appropriate 
training for asylum officers (domestic), refugee officers (abroad), and judges. The 
Congress has asked several times for compulsory classes on religious freedom issues at 
the Department of State’s Foreign Service School, but they remain, although well 
attended, optional. Training programmes for foreign service officers from embassies have 
been greatly expanded in recent years. Provisions urge transnational corporations to 
adopt codes of conduct sensitive to the right to freedom of religion.  
 
On 16 December 2016, President Obama signed into law the Frank R. Wolf International 
Religious Freedom Act, which amends the 1998 Act by specifically extending protection 
to non-theists as well as those who do not claim any particular religion. It does not 
materially change IRFA, but it does spell out certain authorities and provisions in greater 






Annexe 4: Personal Interviews  
 
1. Pew Research Center, Interview with Samirah, Anna, and Virginia, 31 July 2019. 
 
2. Interview with Knox Thames, US Department of State, 2 August 2019.  
 
3. Interview with Bob Boehme, consultant to US Department of State, 13 August 
2019.  
 
4. Interview with Mollie Zapata, Holocaust Museum. 
 
5. Judd Birdsall, Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion and Diplomacy (TPNRD). 
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